COMPETITIVENESS AND POLICY · 30 JULY 2026 · 9 MIN READ

Youth, Tariffs, and India’s Strategic Autonomy Story

Two recent issues – the youth movement, new tariffs imposed ondemanded and Russian oil purchases and future tariffs of 100% on generics – made me reflect over the foreign policy posture of India.

I have never been comfortable with how India’s foreign policy establishment sells “strategic autonomy". India has treated autonomy as an end in itself, while its actual offer to the world—industrial depth, labour quality, and foreign-policy institutional reliability—remains underdeveloped. The reckoning is now visible: a self‑styled major power doubling down on middle‑power multilateralism in a system where the hegemon is reluctant, the rising power is deeply distrusted, and the domestic labour market is visibly cracking underneath.

After independence, as a post‑colonial state emerging out of the Cold War, with remnants of the NAM movement, strategic autonomy protected sovereignty, avoided entangling alliances, and retained the room to manoeuvre between extremely polarised blocs. However, over time, the doctrine has morphed into a reflex that avoids hard decisions: invoking “autonomy” and "multi-alignment" whenever hard choices are demanded.

CSIS noted not long ago that India’s aspiration for strategic autonomy will be stress‑tested as other states push it to pick sides in conflicts from Ukraine to the Gulf. It points out that India’s external power is still largely confined to its immediate neighbourhood and to rhetorical influence, even as its economic and military toolkit expands.

Unfortunately, India has responded to its diminishing influence by doubling down on a middle-power posture: leader of the “Global South", friend to all and enemy to none, and participant in BRICS, QUAD, G20, and a widening array of regional arrangements. As far as I am concerned, it is just a permanent hedging position.

In almost every conversation I have, India is present in every forum and cautious in every commitment, resistant to binding obligations that might jeopardise the autonomy doctrine. This was sustainable when the system allowed for loose, low‑cost participation and acting as a counterweight to China carried value, but it is far less sustainable when the United States is shifting to a more coercive posture, including steep tariff surcharges and sharply higher fees for skilled migration channels that India has long relied on.

China, the rising power, remains economically indispensable for inputs and trade, while still deeply distrusted on security and border issues. India’s attempt to prevail with a middle‑power identity doesn’t seem feasible or capable of serving its economic interests. India assumes its size, position and democratic norms buy infinite patience from others. The reality is that partners now demand clarity: who will India stand with at the point of stress, which supply chains will it protect, and what commitments can they bank on when domestic pressure rises? The strategic autonomy doctrine, as practised right now, does not answer those questions. It evades them.

It seems with the new tariffs from the Trump administration impending, India is at an inflection point. This is not a “Trump Administration” issue. This is now structural and unlikely to be wound back by future administrations. Whilst, on the US side, tariff policy and migration controls have moved centre‑stage. New tariffs on imports and sharply higher fees on high‑skill visa categories, justified to protect domestic workers and correct trade imbalances, will disproportionately hit India, whose growth model leans on human‑capital arbitrage.

Trump’s 50% tariff regime is estimated to shave roughly 0.4–0.8 percentage points off India’s annual GDP growth, with India’s Chief Economic Adviser and major houses like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converging around a 0.5–0.6% drag. Around 55% of India’s roughly $87 billion in goods exports to the US are exposed to these duties. A sharp H‑1B fee hike to $100,000 per new petition will compress EBITDA margins at leading IT firms by about 7–15%, with sector analysts warning that export growth potentially slows down to below 4% annually. And perhaps even more perilous is the announced generic drug import tariff, which will face a 100% tariff from 2028, rising to 200% in 2029, directly threatening one of India’s few globally scaled, hard‑to‑replace export franchises.

Official tone from the US, post National Security Strategy of 2025, around India has moved from “indispensable ally” language to purely transactional talk of burden‑sharing and market access.

With China, on the other hand, the economic relationship has not decoupled; it has deepened in precisely the sectors India claims as future growth engines. India’s trade deficit with China reached about 100B in the 2024–25 fiscal year, an all-time high, with imports of Chinese electronics, machinery and chemicals far outstripping limited exports, making China responsible for roughly a third of India’s overall trade imbalance. Any rapprochement since the 2024 BRICS summit is “driven less by trust, which remains scarce, than by necessity", with Beijing maintaining controls on critical exports and, at best, an ambiguous security posture on the border.

This unenviable position of being between a “rock and a hard place” is where India is trying to assert autonomy: a hegemon reluctant to invest politically in India and a rival that remains both indispensable and deeply distrusted. Under those conditions, the logic of eventually needing a patron is not sentimental; it is structural. Someone has to backstop security, technology and market access when shocks hit.

This is where India’s emperor‑has‑no‑clothes problem becomes acute – whilst the doctrine gestures at autonomy, the underlying value proposition remains incomplete and ends up presenting as a dependence.

If one inspects the Indian value proposition, weaknesses surface quite easily.

On the economic side, India has a real mass with headline growth that keeps global investors interested. Yet the industrial base is largely contained in the hands of few, heavily scaffolded by production-linked incentives and tariff protections, with very weak export competitiveness when compared with East Asian peers.

On the security side, India has moved from pure import dependence to substantial indigenous capability in missiles, radars and air defence. Yet the reliance on foreign suppliers for engines, advanced avionics and high‑end sensors remains.

What India needs to present to become a credible partner is unique capabilities that cannot easily be substituted. It should be able to lock in binding commitments that survive domestic political noise, and have an institutional and labour base that is stable enough to deliver on long‑term projects.

India is well positioned with a booming economy, democratic norms, Western values and outlook, and excellent relationships with Gulf energy and SWFs along with a large, well-received diaspora – all working in its favour – but when it comes to binding commitments that can survive the domestic, rambunctious, extremely divisive political context, it comes undone. Perhaps the most underpriced constraint in India’s strategic story is not tariffs or defence platforms; it is youth and labour. Quite a topical issue given the recent youth protests.

On paper, the Government of India highlights an increase in the labour force participation rate for those 15 and above from 49.8% in 2017–18 to 60.1% in 2023–24, with the overall unemployment rate falling from 6.0% to 3.2%. It emphasises that youth unemployment dropped from 17.8% to 10.2%, lower than the global average of 13.3% reported by the ILO’s World Employment and Social Outlook. Yet the World Bank’s internationally comparable data still reports youth unemployment at around 16% of the 15–24 labour force in 2024, down from higher levels but significantly above many East Asian comparators. The ILO’s broader work on NEET youth shows roughly one in four young people globally in this category in 2025, with women’s NEET rate double that of men's.

What is even more incongruent is how the education system is evolving. The tertiary gross enrolment ratios have risen from 23.7 in 2014–15 to 30.0 in 2023–24, with higher education enrolment jumping from 34.2m to 45.0m in just a decade, a 34% tertiary GER. In contrast, vocational enrolment at the upper secondary level remains woefully low at just 1.9%, one of the smallest shares among OECD and partner countries. The proportion of students in vocational tracks at lower and upper secondary is close to the bottom of the global distribution, and student‑to‑teacher ratios in tertiary education are among the highest.

In my travels across Indian cities and countryside, I keep meeting young Indians whose families have pushed them relentlessly towards white‑collar degrees—engineering, management, IT, generic commerce—irrespective of labour‑market saturation. Vocational education and technical training are seen as inferior, a second‑class path. The result is a society and education system that pushes GER ever higher on the tertiary side while exacerbating an inadequate supply of vocational tracks that could actually support a manufacturing push. India is producing more credentialed youth and fewer skilled technicians, machinists, welders, and mechatronics specialists—the people who make industrial competitiveness real.

“Strategic Autonomy”, it appears to me, is denying this reality. A country cannot credibly offer itself as a manufacturing alternative, a defence partner, or a logistics hub if its labour market remains tilted towards low‑quality white‑collar work lacking basic vocational skills. The reason I call India’s autonomy doctrine an emperor‑has‑no‑clothes story is that it consistently ignores the core question: what, precisely, is India offering that a partner can build dependency on?

In my view, India’s value proposition rests in a combination of geography, scale and potential institutional reform. It sits at the intersection of energy routes, manufacturing relocations and digital markets. It has a large youth population that could still be re‑skilled toward more technical and productive work. It has the ability, on paper, to connect Gulf capital, European technology and Asian supply chains into a new growth corridor. Nothing in strategic autonomy, as currently practised, speaks directly to that offer. Unfortunately, at this stage, all the doctrine presents is rhetoric and slogans: voice of the Global South, friend to all, non-aligned, and multi-aligned.

Deeply divisive domestic politics focus on sovereignty and choice rather than on building a stable platform that other countries can actually rely on.

The uncomfortable upside of the current reckoning is that it clarifies where change is actually needed – social and economic.

The recent youth movement is a signal of systemic dysfunction in the labour and education markets. Rising tertiary GER instead of technical training and job creation points to a misallocation of human capital. Social attitudes and preference for public sector white-collar work mean that a significant share of educated youth remains locked out of meaningful work. Unfortunately, this is not simply a social issue; it is a hard constraint on India’s ability to offer credible manufacturing, logistics and services platforms to trading partners.

This is also apparent in the military reform agenda, with the recent Agnipath initiative facing widespread opposition. The programme proposed to reduce the median age of the forces and restrain the swelling pension bill, which, together with salaries, accounts for around 50–70% of total defence expenditure.

Protests and violent agitation against this short‑term enlistment exposed how deeply youth in the country feel entitled to stable, long‑tenure military careers with pension security. The programme folded despite it being obvious that even after including the Agnipath programme, salaries, pensions, and maintenance expenses will still absorb roughly 71% of the Ministry of Defence allocation, leaving only 29% for capital outlay—far below the 60:40 ratio recommended for serious modernisation.

On the economic front too, India needs to replace incentive‑heavy and subsidy maximisation industrial policy with real competitiveness in logistics, firm‑level productivity, technology absorption and labour quality. On the defence front, indigenisation must move beyond platforms into engines, propulsion, AI chips and sensing technologies, or import dependence will reappear at higher levels of the stack. On the diplomatic front, India’s multilateral activism needs to be matched by sharper choices about where it is willing to accept constraint in exchange for patronage or deep partnership.

None of this requires abandoning autonomy as a principle. It necessitates acknowledging that autonomy is only useful if the underlying system is strong enough to stand without constant external backstopping. Right now, the labour market, education system and industrial base are not there. The doctrine pretends they are. That is the emperor‑has‑no‑clothes moment.

India’s leadership aspirations are not illegitimate. With the right value proposition, it would be less about refusing alignment and more about choosing alignment from a position of strong capability. India could afford to be choosy because partners would need it in concrete ways—supply chains, defence systems, energy logistics, technology platforms. Until then, autonomy is a slogan that papers over the absence of a hard value proposition.

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