COMPETITIVENESS AND POLICY · 19 JULY 2026 · 10 MIN READ

Coming home to the same boat, just a different ocean

Landing back in Sydney this month, the first thing that struck me wasn't jet lag. It was how many conversations with colleagues here picked up exactly where the ones in Europe left off — energy costs, fiscal headroom, a deteriorating relationship with Washington, and a sense that the ground rules of the last thirty years no longer apply. I didn't expect to bring the same anxiety home with me. I did.

The economic and geostrategic architecture of Australia I left in 2008 is fundamentally different from the one I left in 2008. It seems almost all lenses I could apply convey the same sense of shift –

Fiscal position first. I recall surviving the nuclear cooldown of the GFC with markets largely dead, but fiscally the country was strong – it entered the GFC with net debt near zero and a structural surplus built over the preceding decades. However, today, the country runs persistent deficits, and defence spending is committed at $62.6 billion Australian dollars for 2026-27 — a 19% increase — against a ten-year integrated investment profile of $887 billion. AUKUS costs are already escalating beyond original projections; Australia has paid $2 billion above initial estimates through contributions to the US and UK submarine industrial bases before building a single vessel. The country's fiscal headroom is shrinking rapidly, making it difficult to survive another similar future crisis.

The relationship with China, too, has been structurally renegotiated by the other side. In 2008, China was an uncomplicated growth engine for us — iron ore demand was purely additive to national income. However, today China accounts for ~30% of our exports, and this association is now a tool of leverage in Beijing's hands. China Mineral Resources Group spent seven months blocking BHP iron ore cargoes before extracting a settlement that included yuan-denominated pricing — a structural precedent that Fortescue is now managing under the same framework, with approximately 90% of its production directed towards Chinese buyers. When your largest trade partner is a government-owned entity with documented price-suppression objectives that starts dictating the destination of most of your industry's output, calling it an "export relationship" is a euphemism.

On the geopolitical front, with the Donroe Doctrine and Trump-related policy volatility, Australia is facing the same turmoil as the rest of the world – albeit with additional unwarranted costs. The US alliance, for us, seems to have become explicitly transactional and extractive.

In 2008, the AUSFTA was genuinely reciprocal and cost-free. In 2026, Australia is paying a rising security premium – AUKUS contributions, forward basing, and Five Eyes obligations – while absorbing a 10% tariff imposed under the Trump administration's Section 122 authority, applied to all trading partners regardless of strategic association. This despite the US running a goods-and-services trade surplus with Australia of $18.5 billion in 2025. The economic structure of this alliance doesn’t appear to be symmetric any longer.

And it stings more when you remember the history. Australia has been about the most reliable ally the United States has ever had. We turned up for Vietnam – roughly 60,000 Australians served, and 521 came home in coffins. We turned up again after 9/11, staying in Afghanistan for two decades in what became our longest war ever, and losing 41 soldiers there. We were in Iraq too. This was never fair-weather friendship; it was blood, and plenty of it, spilled in wars that were America's to fight. A country that has stood in the trench that consistently might reasonably expect something better in return than a flat 10% tariff and a running tab for its own security.

Then there is energy. In 2008, Australia was riding a terms-of-trade boom, with inflation being the principal pre-crisis concern. In 2026, GDP growth came in at 0.3% for the March quarter — household discretionary spending was flat, mining output was hit by Cyclone Koji, and net trade detracted 0.8 percentage points as data-centre-driven imports surged. The RBA has delivered three rate hikes this year — in February, March, and May — into an economy carrying household debt above 180% of GDP, one of the highest ratios in the OECD. That debt load is the real source of compression. Rate transmission in a mortgage-heavy market is faster and deeper than standard models assume. The 0.3% quarterly growth is partly a debt-service story, not just an energy-shock story, and the rate cycle makes it worse before it gets better.

On energy reserves, the number is unambiguous: Australia currently holds between 30 and 37 days of physically available fuel. The IEA minimum for member states is 90 days. Australia is the only IEA member that has not reliably met that threshold since 2012. This is not Hormuz, nor is this specific government; this has been the case for over a decade, through five successive governments. The closure of the Strait exposed what was already there.

And the buffer is even thinner than that headline number suggests. Australia now imports around 80 to 90% of its refined fuel — roughly 850,000 of the 1.1 million barrels it burns every day — because the domestic refinery base has collapsed to just two plants covering barely a fifth of demand. Almost all of that imported fuel comes from Asian refineries in Singapore, South Korea, Japan and Malaysia. Here is the squeeze: those same refineries run largely on Middle Eastern crude. Singapore, our single biggest supplier, sources around 70% of its crude from the Gulf. So, Hormuz doesn't just threaten the odd tanker bound for Australia — it chokes the refineries we depend on to make our fuel in the first place. And when those Asian suppliers feel the pinch, they do the rational thing and look after themselves first: China, Thailand and South Korea have all curbed refined-product exports since the crisis began. A 30-day stockpile sitting at the end of a supply chain that funnels back through a single strait isn't a buffer. It's a countdown.

To summarise, for me, there are three structural threads — technological positioning, transactional alliance, and energy vulnerability — that are converging and compounding.

Overexposure to raw resource exports means we are losing out on the AI era's high productivity and high wage growth — in compute, AI-driven services, and advanced manufacturing. Combined with our most important security relationship shifting towards leverage rather than shared values. We're facing tariffs even though America runs a trade surplus with us, and we keep paying higher AUKUS costs. What finally puts it all into the crisis zone is the energy shock, landing on a country with the smallest fuel buffer of any advanced economy — we're down to two refineries from eight in 2005 — and a government with little room to respond without stoking the very inflation the RBA is already raising rates to tame.

In my view, this is the same trap that Europe has been stuck in for the last few years: an antiquated commodity and industrial base losing ground, a security partner going transactional, and an energy shock hitting fiscal constraints with little cushion. The difference? Europe's exposure was so big it had no choice but to face the problem head-on. Australia's is smaller in scale — and that's exactly what makes it dangerous, because it looks manageable.

This scenario is not unfamiliar; Gulf states had to adjust to oil price volatility, and the South-east Asian manufacturing economies had to endure currency swings and geopolitics-driven supply chain disruption. Nations approaching these issues as discreet challenges exhaust their policy instruments against each component and arrive at the reform question with an empty war chest. The excise relief extension, the emergency fuel releases, the rate hikes into a slowing consumer base — these are instruments. This will not provide a coherent national strategy to ensure the prosperity of the lucky country over the next century — and luck, as Donald Horne warned, was never meant to be a strategy.

I distinctly remember when my all-time favourite politician, a very polarising figure, Paul Keating, warned in 1986 that Australia risked becoming a banana republic – a warning about a current account and terms-of-trade crisis that forced the floating of the dollar, financial deregulation, and a decade of productivity reform that built the endurance Australia is now spending down. That moment worked because it was treated as a genuine inflection point, and both major parties eventually accepted the diagnosis and acted on it across successive governments.

The 2026 parallel is not that Australia is about to become a banana republic in the 1986 sense. It is that this moment has the same structural texture: settings that worked for the previous era stopping simultaneously, with the choice being whether to treat the convergence as a genuine reform trigger or reach for the nearest short-term instrument. The OECD's prescription is explicit — rebuild fiscal buffers by closing tax exemptions and improving spending efficiency — and says nothing about distributing excise relief.

There is one meaningful complication the 1986 analogy glosses over. That reform worked because it generated political harmony across party lines across a decade. The current institutional environment — five prime ministers in the decade before 2022, entrenched short-termism in the policy calendar — makes that kind of sustained reform harder to anchor. Political will and institutional durability are separate questions.

The single most underexplored idea in the current policy debate, for me personally, is what AUKUS represents if it is managed as industrial policy rather than a defence procurement exercise.

A $268–368 billion, 30-year investment in nuclear submarine capability also seeds advanced manufacturing—shipbuilding, nuclear engineering, submarine systems integration, and precision components—at a scale Australia has never committed to in its economic history. South Australia and Western Australia are well positioned to anchor a domestic defence industrial base that currently exists in no meaningful form. The question is whether procurement strategy and industry strategy are the same document. At present, I feel they are not. In my experience, typically, procurement agencies optimise for delivery cost and schedule; industrial development agencies optimise for employment and technology transfer. The unresolved conflict between them typically produces a contracted foreign prime and a small local-content requirement that satisfies neither objective. The AUKUS opportunity requires a deliberate institutional decision – that the submarine programme is Australia's version of South Korea's semiconductor thesis: not just a capability purchase, but a generational allocation to technology and workforce that produces durable economic returns well beyond the defence budget line.

That decision has not been made. It could be.

Three other structural adjustments are available, though none proceeds without conceding a sequencing constraint: political capital is scarce, and these shifts will place a substantial demand on it.

Critical minerals — lithium, cobalt, and rare earths — offer a differentiated export position where Chinese state buyer leverage is structurally weaker than in iron ore. Australian reserves are world-class. The processing gap is real: the country still exports raw ore rather than battery-grade products at scale. Narrowing that gap demands both sovereign investment and long-term offtake agreements. Neither has materialised in considerable volume. The opportunity is genuine. The institutional architecture to capture it is not yet built.

On energy security: a 30-37-day diesel reserve is a policy failure. Meeting the IEA 90-day minimum requires storage infrastructure, long-term supply contracts, and a government mandate that accounts for the fact that private operators have no economic incentive to hold expensive fuel inventory exceeding operational necessity. The Hormuz crisis provided the clearest public rationale for that commitment in a generation. Whether Canberra addresses the underlying incentive structure or cycles through emergency releases will reveal more about institutional capacity than any strategy document.

On technology, the constraint is not the one usually named. Australia is not short of talent or research horsepower. Skilled migration is at record highs, our TR/PR migration visas actively court highly skilled individuals, and the university system is genuinely world-class — a cluster of globally top-ranked institutions producing excellent research, backed by CSIRO, a national science agency with a track record of foundational invention. The raw ingredients — people, ideas, renewable energy, land — are all here. What is missing is the connective tissue linking the ingredients that get turned into scale: the US startup and venture-funding ecosystem. We lack common platforms and close engagement with American founders and capital, and the regulatory regimes on either side are not sufficiently synchronised to allow technology, talent and money to flow seamlessly across the Pacific. Build that bridge – rather than chasing an imagined talent shortage – and the compute hub ambition starts to look like an opportunity converting into reality.

Australia has vastly more resources, more institutional quality, and more strategic leverage than almost any comparable economy. The structural repositioning I am describing is not aspirational. It is within reach. The question is whether the political cycle will generate enough coherence to let it compound or whether the next round of excise extensions and quarterly management decisions will crowd out the harder, longer work.

The insulating layers that made Australia comfortable for thirty years are thinner. That is not a crisis. It is a prompt. Whether the response is strategic or instrumental will define the economic character of the decade ahead.

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