COMPETITIVENESS AND POLICY · 9 NOVEMBER 2026 · 4 MIN READ

New Zealand Needs a Government That Can Decide

The current election results have brought back all the reasons I have never been comfortable with MMP as the platform for New Zealand’s democracy. I think it brings back the arguments for a different architecture, not a minor tune-up.

On the preliminary count of 7 November, Labour took 29.36% of the party vote and National 29.21%. National won 42 seats, all electorates, with no list seats. Labour won 36. Eleven overhang seats lifted the House from 120 to 131, against a previous record of three. Official results are due on 27 November, and roughly 400,000 special votes are still to be counted, so every seat figure is provisional.

My arithmetic puts National’s proportional entitlement near 35 seats. It won 42 electorates. I expect much of that gap comes from voters choosing an assured outcome with a tested, capable National local MP, then speculating with the party vote on the nation's future with a favoured ideology, with little or obscured consequences. And therein lies the issue.

In our MMP system, a voter can pick a capable candidate for their own patch and then gamble on an ideology for the whole country, with almost no consequence. The nation carries the cost, as does the party whose candidates voters liked, which gets no list MPs, as well as the front bench that depended on the list. The finance minister, the Attorney-General and the Speaker are out on the preliminary count. My biggest objection to the system is that it hoists a government on us that nobody voted for in full. No wonder parties respond by putting their effort where the party vote is won, in positioning and bloc signalling, and less into the dull work of governing. The unprecedented rise of the Opportunity Party is an example of this - where performative positioning works better than governance performance.

We borrowed the MMP system from West Germany, which had very specific post-World War reasons to build consensus into its institutions. New Zealand, a small economy with significant dependence on primary commodities, in a fast-moving geopolitical environment, is not Germany. We need a government that can decide quickly.

In 2023, we waited for 41 days to form the ruling coalition, the longest post-election negotiation in 27 years. We lose six weeks of the three-year term before policy bargaining begins. This is further complicated by our compelling need to check the roots soon after planting, which means we want to keep the term short, and we then punish governments for not delivering. Voters rejected a four-year term in 1967 (68.1%) and 1990 (69.3%), and the government dropped the 2026 referendum in February, so this may be a lost cause, but it shouldn’t be. It is true that the MMP system slows down government, not stop it, but in a small country, speed matters.

The governments of 1984 to 1993 were widely unpopular, but they kept the country solvent. Post-war New Zealand depended on one export market, Britain. In 1973 Britain joined the European Economic Community, and that dependence became a liability. By December 1984, the dollar had fallen from US$1.31 to 49 US cents. In June 1984, a single day’s run cost the Reserve Bank NZ$256 million and left it with NZ$240 million in liquid reserves. Muldoon obstinately refused to devalue, against the advice of his own officials.

It was the reform that then spanned two governments of opposite parties that saved the country from imminent bankruptcy. Labour legislated from 1984, ushering in Rogernomics and National, elected in 1990, kept going. Ruth Richardson’s Fiscal Responsibility Act, assented to in June 1994, tried to bind governments to fiscal discipline. That continuity needed single-party majorities that only FPP could deliver. Voters, due to reform fatigue, adopted the system in 1993 that makes such a programme harder to repeat. The reforms stopped a crisis and opened the economy, and growth was vigorous from 1991.

I would keep the decisive half and add a check. Elect the lower house in single-member electorates, under FPP voting, so that we can hold one party accountable for the result. I think we need to bring back the upper house, or a Senate, elected by the list. The party vote moves to the chamber, reducing the cost of an ideological gamble, because the Senate can delay and revise, but hold neither confidence nor supply. This is fundamentally different from the old Legislative Council.  Unlike 1950, this is neither appointed nor packed by the government.

New Zealand is running an operating deficit of about NZ$8.7 billion this year, roughly 1.9% of GDP, and net core Crown debt stands at NZ$186.8 billion, or 40.9% of GDP. Treasury’s pre-election forecast has that ratio peaking near 44% in 2027/28, and the Budget forecast puts the peak at 46%. Unemployment is 5.7%, inflation is 3.7% against a policy rate of 2.75%, and the second quarter added just 0.2% to output. Terms of trade are down 9%, and the current account deficit is 3.2% of GDP.  

We do not get to hold an AA+ rating on our past record, but on the credibility of our fiscal consolidation path, which requires a finance minister who can defend these numbers to the agencies, the bond market and the coalition partners. But the person best placed to do that is already out of Parliament before coalition talks begin. A government that cannot name a credible steward of the fiscal numbers is asking investors to take the consolidation on trust, and trust is what a 4.1% fiscal gap has to be bought with.

Any change needs political appetite. The last time New Zealand changed its electoral system, it took a Royal Commission, two referendums and years of voter frustration. I am not sure we are up for it, and I dread to think what that means for us in Aotearoa.

#NewZealand #ElectoralReform #MMP

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