No Exit Without Structural Change
The war has not yet produced a strategic resolution!
It has degraded Iran’s military prowess, battered the infrastructure, put severe and perhaps irreversible stress on its economic future, put its political leadership under pressure, both from a population that has already rejected the regime and now the wider international community that has branded it a pariah state - including the neighbours in GCC and the OIC. But degraded is not neutralised. This weakened regime still retains enough asymmetric capacity to disrupt shipping and keep global energy infrastructure in a state of permanent anxiety.
And this is a critical factor in determining the future course of events, because the mistake I see in most outside commentary, especially from the US, is treating military attrition as equivalent to strategic resolution. It is not. A state can lose major parts of its conventional order of battle and still retain enough asymmetric reach to force buyers, insurers, and shippers to behave defensively. In this case, that reach runs through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb, via proxy networks supported by a transnational religious-political doctrine that extends Iranian influence deep into the domestic politics of its neighbours.
Attempts, although tempting, to reach a negotiated outcome with Tehran that leaves the current power structure intact will not produce lasting peace. The challenge with Iran is structural, not rhetorical.
The Islamic Republic's strategic model is built on regional leverage. Its leadership cannot afford to accept a settlement that strips away these tools of external influence, because those tools are also the internal justification for the regime's existence. A supreme leader who cannot project regional power, cannot claim to be the defender of an oppressed transnational community, and cannot hold the global energy corridor as a pressure point loses his core political proposition. Accommodation of the regime, therefore, does not change its incentives. It restores its operational space.
It is important to understand that the regime’s challenge is bifold - internally, it faces deep alienation from its population, having delivered disastrous results over the last four decades. The January 2026 uprisings and their brutal suppression are part of an accelerating pattern of domestic rejection. Externally, it faces sustained hostility, sanctions pressure, and institutional condemnation. The UN Security Council adopted a Gulf-backed resolution condemning Iranian attacks on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan. OIC and the neighbouring GCC nations are now also seeing the regime as a pariah. A regime caught between internal illegitimacy and external isolation tends not to moderate. It tends toward coercion because cornered regimes resort to it to sustain themselves.
Any deal that preserves the current structure will therefore be provisional by design. The same actors, the same incentives, the same escalation pathways remain in place. The result is deferred conflict, not resolved conflict.
First and foremost, the most underestimated element of the Iranian security threat to the GCC is not its missiles or its drones. It is its transnational ideological architecture.
Wilayat al-Faqih — the guardianship of the Islamic jurist — is the constitutional and theological foundation of the Islamic Republic. This explicitly transnational structure challenges the national identities of the citizens of regional countries. The Supreme Leader does not merely govern Iran. Under this doctrine, his authority extends to all Shia Muslims who accept it, regardless of national citizenship. That is not a theological abstraction. It is an operational instrument. Groups and individuals across Arab Shia communities who subscribe to Wilayat al-Faqih have displayed their deference to Iranian authority retroactively and politically. That is how Tehran builds influence without deploying conventional forces. This is the structural threat the GCC nations cannot neutralise through air defence or maritime patrols alone. The IRGC has systematically agitated and radicalised Shia communities in pro-Western, oil-producing Arab states, training militant networks, financing cells, and providing weapons. In March 2026 alone, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar each announced the dismantling of several IRGC and Hezbollah-linked cells that were engaged in espionage, money laundering, and the planning of terrorist operations targeting vital infrastructure. They were the visible surface of a network that had been embedded for years. The geographic concentration of this threat in the oil-rich areas of the Gulf makes it even more potent. The IRGC's use of Wilayat al-Faqih as an operational doctrine is not about religion. It is about state-sponsored exploitation of identity. It converts legitimate local grievances into cross-border leverage for Tehran. As long as a state with regional ambitions backs that doctrine, a coercive apparatus, and a transnational religious claim, the eastern GCC coastline remains structurally exposed regardless of the military balance.
Removing the regime's ability to weaponise this doctrine — by dismantling the political-security structure that operationalises it — is therefore not a secondary goal. It is a primary condition for durable peace. A post-theocratic Iranian order that does not assert extraterritorial religious sovereignty removes the single most important mechanism by which Tehran can draw Gulf populations into a wider conflict.
Secondly, the Strait of Hormuz accounts for nearly one-fifth of global oil supply. Any credible threat to it is not a local commodity story. It is a global macro variable, and it does not need a total closure; it just needs credible uncertainty. Credible uncertainty forces buyers to build inventory, insurers to price escalation risk, shippers to abandon routes, and traders to hedge.
Furthermore, it forces every central bank with energy-sensitive inflation to recalibrate its policy path. That is how a geographic chokepoint of 21 nautical miles becomes embedded in global pricing across oil, LNG, freight, and industrial input chains. If crude stays above $ 100 for a sustained period, the spillover will not remain confined to commodities. It will move into inflation, consumer demand, industrial margins, debt service, and political stability. The OECD's March 2026 Interim Economic Outlook flags energy price increases as a direct risk to inflation expectations, debt market stability, and growth trajectories in member economies. The OECD is already describing inflation as the biggest risk to debt markets facing a major stress test. Consumer prices in OECD member countries remain far above pre-COVID levels. The Global Debt Report 2026 documents elevated sovereign borrowing needs across the OECD.
Sustained energy pressure is not going to be merely a financial inconvenience; it is a political detonator. It hits households first — through fuel, food, transport, and imported goods — but soon it hits governments — through fiscal pressure, demands for relief, and reduced policy space. Already, billions of dollars are being released by governments worldwide to address the cost-of-living issues caused by the current energy crisis, rather than being deployed to boost economic growth. It hits politics last and hardest — through elections, protests, and the breakdown of public trust in institutions already stretched by years of inflation and cost-of-living crisis. The global economy is already absorbing the cost of an unresolved conflict.
Just because some oil continues to move through exceptions, rerouting, grey channels, and quiet workarounds hardly makes the case that the market can manage disruption. It cannot, and this framing is misleading.
Markets price the probability distribution of future disruption. As long as the coercive architecture remains intact — as long as the IRGC can credibly threaten to interdict shipping, board vessels, or close the strait — the tail risk is real, and will be priced. Partial workarounds reduce the immediate volume shock, but they do not remove the structural fragility. The risk premium stays. The insurance spread stays. The defensive behaviour stays. And every month it stays, the global economy absorbs another layer of accumulated damage. This is why global political hesitation has a real economic cost that compounds over time.
So what are the plausible end states? In my view, there is no stable future in which the current Iranian regime retains its full coercive architecture and the GCC simultaneously enjoys durable peace. The regional incentive structures do not permit it. Therefore, as far as I can see, two realistic end states could be:
Optimal being a new regional architecture: A concerted effort by the international powers permanently constraining the regime's coercive capacity — its missile and drone programs, its proxy networks, its maritime harassment capability, and the political-theological doctrine that extends its influence into Gulf domestic politics. This end state will require not only a military intervention but also establishment of a post-conflict security architecture: integrated regional defense, enforced demilitarization of Iran's power projection toolkit down to a level consistent with territorial defense rather than expeditionary coercion, and the construction of a regional security framework with credible enforcement mechanisms, but more importantly one that recognizes the global implications and hence global supervision.
Immediate but temporary appeasement: A negotiated accommodation that accepts the regime as a permanent feature of the regional order, manages escalation through deterrence, and absorbs recurring crises as the price of stability. This option institutionalises threats and converts the current conflict into chronic coercion. It keeps Hormuz permanently contestable and under threat, the Gulf's eastern coastline permanently exposed, and the global economy permanently hostage to a single regime's survival calculus.
There is no comfortable third option. Everything else is just a post-dated check for a crisis.
This conflict has clearly demonstrated to GCC states that they can no longer rely on the illusion that regional war will not directly affect their skies, ports, and economies. For the first time in history, Iran attacked every GCC member state simultaneously. It has punctured the security bubble that we have lived under for the past several decades. GCC states’ response has to be structural, not reactive:
They must integrate defence at the regional level. The current fragmented national responses to swarm tactics and the mixed platforms in use are insufficient. GCC regional security cannot be managed any longer through unilateral national approaches. An integrated defence framework that can see, decide, and engage cross-domain threats at speed is a prerequisite, not an aspiration.
Harden critical infrastructure. Ras Tanura, desalination plants, civilian airports, and port facilities have all been targeted. The assumption that energy infrastructure is off-limits has been disproved. The structural leverage Iran derives from controlling the Strait must be diluted by developing alternative export corridors across the Arabian landmass and into the Eastern Mediterranean. There needs to be better planning for backup energy routes integrated across the GCC countries - less competition and more cooperation is the ask of the moment.
Dismantle embedded proxy networks. The March 2026 simultaneous exposure of IRGC and Hezbollah cells across four Gulf states is the right model — intelligence coordination, preemptive action, and public deterrent signalling.
Align with the US security framework while building autonomous capability. Faced with daily missile and drone threats, Gulf states alone cannot provide a sufficient deterrent. But dependence on an external power without building genuine autonomous capability creates a fragile arrangement. The goal is conditional alignment, not permanent dependence.
At the same time, there is an even more urgent imperative for the global community - Hormuz is a global inflation variable, a shipping variable, and a supply-chain variable. Destabilisation in the Strait results in the cost being distributed across every economy that depends on stable energy logistics. The international system must enforce a new security order in which no single actor can weaponise the world's most sensitive energy corridor, and ensure it prohibits hostage politics that demand payment in terms of inflation, instability, and strategic erosion. There is no neutral position. Inaction is also a choice, but it extracts a substantial price. I hope the UK, Germany, France, and other responsible nations have the political courage to engage, putting their misgivings about the individual actors aside for now.
In summary, and in my personal view, a durable peace requires three structural conditions to be met simultaneously -
First, Iran's coercive capacity — missiles, drones, proxy networks, maritime harassment, and the state infrastructure that funds and directs them — must be permanently reduced to a level that no longer threatens the Gulf or the strait.
Second, the transnational political-religious doctrine that allows Tehran to extend its authority into Gulf domestic politics must be severed from state power. A post-theocratic Iranian order — one that does not assert extraterritorial sovereignty over Shia Muslims in other states — removes the primary mechanism by which Iran can pull vulnerable coastal populations into a wider conflict equation and keeps the eastern GCC coastline perpetually exposed.
Third, the GCC and the international community must build an enforced security architecture strong enough to raise the cost of coercion above any foreseeable benefit. Without enforcement, agreements are provisional. Without a framework that outlives any one crisis cycle, the region will keep reverting to the same pattern.
Every month that passes without those conditions being met, oil prices absorb a conflict premium, OECD inflation stays stickier than it would otherwise, debt markets face additional stress, and political systems across the developed world absorb another layer of public frustration they cannot easily handle. The world is already paying for this. Will the leadership of OECD countries like the UK, Germany, and France continue to distance themselves and pay the price of energy instability by compromising their economic and national welfare outcomes? Will the political leadership of Spain continue to posture and virtue-signal at the cost of its economic recovery? Will countries like India and Pakistan continue to hedge their bets between the West and Iran, as long as they get a trickle of oil reaching their shores? Or will we find the political courage to bring together a multinational effort to address the rogue behaviour of a pariah state?
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-iran-war-strait-of-hormuz-ee950ad4
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