GULF POLITICAL ECONOMY · 22 JUNE 2026 · 12 MIN READ

Middle East: After the Islamabad Memorandum

I landed back in the Gulf, where the war has technically ended. The malls are full, coffee queues are long, and the only real signal of stress is on shipping maps and in bond spreads, not on the shop floor. The region is open and confident at street level but is sitting atop a ceasefire masquerading as a security architecture hastily rewritten in Versailles.

The Islamabad Memorandum is a task of impossible measure – a 14‑point path to de-escalation and eventual normalisation with substantial ambiguity that gives negotiators 60 days to resolve substantial international disputes that have plagued the region for well over five decades.

The travesty of this MoU is that the biggest winner is Iran, which receives immediate, tangible, and substantial relief: oil export waivers, the unfreezing of assets, and a USD 300 billion “reconstruction and development” package supposedly funded by the very nations it attacked and putting their economy and populace at substantial risk. Although claiming victory, the United States only gets short-term inflation relief and a chance to declare a fig-leaf “mission accomplished” before mid-term elections and faces long-term erosion of its hegemony and global influence.

The biggest issue with this “MoU” is that the price is being paid by parties and actors who were neither consulted when the war was initiated nor were involved in negotiating its end. The Gulf states, Lebanon, and Iraq, along with the broader neighbourhood, are being treated as collateral terrain, not as responsible parties. They are potentially being asked to finance the reconstruction of the state that just closed their primary energy artery and attacked their infrastructure, while accepting a security settlement that leaves the underlying threat dangling in the long term over their economy and society. This is a ceasefire with a countdown timer and a substantial third-party promissory note.

If one removes the political-victory rhetoric for domestic consumption, the key issue becomes apparent – the memorandum, rightly, separates immediate de‑escalation, providing breathing space to address real issues. The shooting stops now; the nuclear file, permanent sanctions relief, and verification are tackled in a 60‑day negotiating window. However, Iran’s benefits are all front-loaded: liquidity, trade resumption, and sanctions waivers—at least in Iran’s understanding of the MoU. The meaningful outcomes around long-term security guarantees are all back‑loaded, ambiguous, contingent, and politically fragile. Additionally, the language regarding the opening of the Strait of Hormuz is still quite fuzzy. There is a temporary pledge to toll‑free transit and demining, along with a vague indication of “future arrangements” to be worked out with Oman. To muddy the waters further, Iranian officials are already talking about “lawful navigational service fees” and a future regulatory authority that will cement their control over the strait. In other words, Iran gets cash flow and de facto recognition of its veto power over the Strait, whilst everyone else gets a promissory note with a vague promise of safe passage.

I don’t have an issue with the short‑term logic. The closure of Hormuz removed 20% of global supply from the market, sending oil to near-term highs and flowing into headline inflation and sovereign borrowing costs globally. Opening the strait and restoring energy supply, along with signalling a path to normalised shipping, is the fastest way to relieve pressure. In that strictly narrow sense, the memorandum “works”. You can already see it in market pricing: crude off the highs, some normalisation in curves, and a tentative easing of war-risk premiums from their peak insanity. However, in the longer term, the memorandum does not resolve any of the chronic security and economic threats. GCC nations – the victims of the Iranian attack – are potentially being asked to fund the aggressor’s reconstruction and future defence capabilities. The countries that absorbed the blast—physically and economically—were not parties to the terms and now find themselves committed to obligations that they neither shaped nor politically own. Israel still believes Iran is edging towards nuclear-threshold status and maintains a dense proxy network. Not only will it reinforce Hezbollah, but this “victory” will also embolden Houthis in the South. Iran’s new, hardened IRGC-controlled regime now firmly believes that only a hardened deterrent and control over chokepoints allow it to survive. The United States has now demonstrated—again—that its regional posture is ultimately subordinated to national economic stress and electoral timelines.

Talking about Hormuz, we continue to hear conflicting reports about it being open; war-risk premiums for Gulf routes have already skyrocketed. Major P&I clubs withdrew cover. Lloyd's report states that 80 mines laid invalidate all risk models and will need a full 6 months before they can go back to an operational state. In reality, the situation could be worse; mines do not clear themselves, and a 60-day ceasefire does not overwrite actuarial data that must factor in a live adversary with proven capability and will. Underwriters will need months of actual trade and transit data—not vague claims—to rebuild confidence. Until then, every trip into that corridor is priced as an exceptional risk, underwritten voyage by voyage, with premiums that will continue to rewire global routeing choices.

Add to that the dual-chokepoint problem. Bab al‑Mandab has already been weaponised in the past by the Houthis. The Red Sea/Suez route has seen swings of 80–90% in container traffic during previous flare‑ups, and large carriers have proven they will simply go around Africa when the risk/price ratio flips. The memorandum does not bind the Houthis. If anything, it indirectly emboldens them by handing their patron in Tehran a “victory”. Whilst, on paper, the Strait bypass capacity—pipelines, rail, and overland routeing to Red Sea and Arabian Sea ports—offers a six‑million‑plus‑barrel‑per‑day alternative route. But Iranian drones have already hit facilities well outside the Strait, and the message is clear: “outside Hormuz” is not “outside the target zone”. The net result is a shipping system that will remain capacity‑constrained, expensive, and fragile well beyond the headline “reopening” date.

Perhaps the biggest casualty of the terms will be the long-standing security and economic architecture that underpinned the US alliance in the region. The GCC construct was designed for a collective hedge against revolutionary Iran and regional volatility. The design principle was simple: Gulf capital and geography, backed by US hard power, would contain Iran, keep energy supply stable and create prosperity for the region. The price paid for this was a semi-permanent US “muscular forward presence” in the form of bases, exercises, and pre-positioned assets. But over time, that model has steadily crumbled. Obama’s JCPOA was the opening shot—a blunt signal that Washington would now gamble with regional alliances, cutting deals over Gulf states and leaving old partners to fend for themselves. The shift has been quietly acknowledged by the regional powers over the last decade: the US security umbrella is not a blank cheque, and they need to seek other options to provide the much-needed security architecture the region needs. The Islamabad Memorandum makes that implicit understanding explicit. The US, under the current administration and the Donroe Doctrine, has now shown that, under sufficient economic stress, it will trade its hard-fought-for regional primacy for short‑term domestic macro stability. It will do so even if it means leaving its allies to deal with a war they didn't start and a settlement they didn't agree to. That is why the treaty strikes as less like a joint security architecture and more like an off-ramp for Washington.

This also puts the Abraham Accords at an awkward inflexion point. The accord was part of the US-sponsored regional security operating system. Israel normalises with Gulf states; Gulf states gain access to Israeli tech and US security integration; and together they form a strong security bloc while generating new economic corridors. In practice, the security layer of the Accords mattered more than the trade layer. Joining CENTCOM, joint air defence, and intelligence cooperation created a platform that raises the cost for Iran and its proxies. The war and the terms of the MoU expose the limits of the model. Israel emerges from this conflict strategically isolated. It did not achieve regime change in Tehran, did not dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme, and did not destroy Hezbollah’s capabilities. It is now managing a permanent multi-front posture—Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon—without the comfort of unconditional US backing. For the Gulf states, there is now a question mark on how the regional hegemony of Iran can be countered without US intervention. One thing the accords did achieve was to accelerate the realisation in the region that security cannot be outsourced to Washington indefinitely. This is not the decline of the American hegemony; it is a dereliction by choice. The United States still possesses the only navy capable of securing global sea lanes at scale. It still underpins the dollar system, the global currency of trade and debt. It still operates forward bases across the Gulf that could, in theory, be retasked tomorrow. What the memorandum confirms is not incapacity but unwillingness. Faced with the choice between sustaining an unpopular regional war to pursue sustainable long-term objectives or absorbing a reputational hit in exchange for lower oil prices and calmer markets in an election cycle, Washington chose the latter. Rational in narrow domestic terms; destructive in alliance and long-term regional stability terms.

And it raises a broader question: if the US is prepared to trade away its position in the Gulf under energy and electoral stress, what does that mean for potentially upcoming crises in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, where risks and costs are even higher?

Now, to be clear, Iran did not “win” in a conventional sense. Its infrastructure has been devastated; its military is severely diminished; its social fabric has become frail; and its economy has absorbed the most significant shock since the Iraq War. However, this MoU potentially validates Iran’s power to close Hormuz and to leverage proxies in multiple theatres. It secured prompt economic relief and a pathway—however conditional—to the lifting of the sanctions. And it did all this while handling an internal succession that, on paper, should have exposed the regime’s deepest vulnerabilities.

This brings me to Iran’s internal issues that it will need to address, regardless of the MoU's terms. The elevation of Mojtaba Khamenei to Supreme Leader, despite his thin religious credentials, is poised to become a major issue. This is a transition of the Islamic Republic from a revolutionary theocracy to a hereditary coercive security state. The traditional requirement that the Supreme Leader be a top-tier jurist has been discarded in this shift, and its legitimacy is now guaranteed solely by the coercive capacity of the IRGC rather than by theological standing. That shift consolidates the IRGC’s position as the real centre of power. The Corps managed the war, curated the succession, and now sits astride the cash flows unlocked by the memorandum. Therein lies the longer-term risk for the region. The Corps will fund its domestic patronage networks, its missile and drone programmes, and its regional proxies from the same pool of “reconstruction” and oil revenues that the treaty enables. This is where the internal contradictions will show up over the medium term. Religious hardliners will surely resent a relatively junior cleric who inherits the revolution by bloodline rather than by scholarship. Secular and reformist factions will see the hereditary handover as confirmation that the system cannot reform itself. The IRGC will inevitably be forced to arbitrate between factions by using force while keeping the streets suppressed and the regional deterrent active. That is not stability. It is controlled volatility underwritten by new money. The instability in Iran will manifest through its proxies, affecting the region and, eventually, energy and the US. The boomerang from this is inevitable.

China comes out of this as both a beneficiary and a cautionary tale. On the one hand, Beijing gains from any stabilisation of energy flows and will happily take discounted Iranian crude. It also benefits from a diminished US aura and from a Middle East that could now be more open to Chinese capital, technology, and political relations. On the other hand, the crisis exposes China’s reluctance to project military power in a complex theatre. China tried to sit on the fence—deep economic ties with both Iran and the Gulf states, hedging carefully—only to discover that in a real crisis, fence-sitting does not move mines or shoot down drones. The result is a perception hit: a “paper tiger” on the security side, even if it remains a serious player on the trade and investment side.

If we extend the regional lens to India and Pakistan, they, too, are being forced to get off the fence. Both have sizeable Shia populations. Both have long‑standing energy and commercial ties with Iran. At the same time, both rely on Gulf economies for remittances and opportunities for their expatriate labour and capital. Pakistan needs financial support and has been forced to lean harder into military partnerships with Saudi Arabia—trading military manpower and political alignment for liquidity—while trying not to tip its internal sectarian balance. Islamabad has deftly secured the diplomatic win of mediating the memorandum, which it will leverage to secure status and economic concessions, whilst avoiding taking any aggressive military stance that could disturb its internal sectarian balance. India is increasingly drawn to the UAE by investment flows, diaspora ties, and shared concerns over maritime security. Its Chabahar project and civilisational rhetoric about ties to Iran now sit awkwardly alongside its deepening involvement in Gulf logistics, energy, and digital corridors. The long-suffering and much-maligned “Strategic Autonomy” doctrine that India has pursued since NAM days is being stress‑tested in a theatre where sitting on the fence is no longer viable.

The EU is now a marginal global power and continues to watch from the sidelines. Lacking political cohesion and energy resilience to shape outcomes in this theatre, its foreign policy remains fragmented, and its defence industrial base continues to adjust to the demands of the war in Ukraine. In spite of the Gulf states being an important market for the bloc's economic future, the most likely European response is further retreat into ad hoc deals with individual Gulf states and occasional hand-wringing admonitions. They will find that these measures will be seen by the Gulf states as what they are – transactional. The EU has no stake in this region.

So what does that do to the trade and investment flow? I don’t believe it will abandon the region, but it will become more selective. I expect to see substantially increased flow into bypass infrastructure—rail, pipelines, and deep‑water ports outside the tightest choke points—and into defence, cyber, and risk‑mitigation technologies. However, uncomplicated flows into generic hospitality, tourism, and financial services may carry a higher risk premium.

The uncomfortable bottom line is this: the MoU forces the region to live with a more financially resourced, politically validated, and militarily intact Iranian system in exchange for a fragile respite from open war. A neighbour that controls the most critical trade chokepoint, wields hostile proxies at both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, and has now received a diplomatic stamp from Washington. For the US, it means accepting that its bases may become liabilities and its leverage may erode faster than its hardware.

Standing in a Dubai mall, watching people buy luxury goods under a skylight that could be anywhere in the world, it is tempting to treat the memorandum as just another news cycle. Unfortunately, I see a ceasefire that has bought time but not order; liquidity but not resolution; and a reprieve for a brutish rogue regime whose internal contradictions and external leverage will define this region’s risk profile for years.

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