Iraq After the Hegemon
As I read today, 30 September, about the last American forces leaving Iraq, I can’t help but reflect on the past 23 years post-invasion – the mission 'not accomplished', and it all ends with a logistics convoy out of Kurdistan and a statement from Baghdad that 1st of October will be “a new day".
From the outside, this looks like the restoration of much-sought and long-demanded sovereignty for the Iraqi people and nation. On the inside, the Iraqi state is entering its new day unable to pay July’s salaries on time, with its main export route shut, and with the two most powerful armed factions in the country openly operating with full immunity outside the government. The US is leaving an order it built but is not willing to sustain - a recurring theme in the region when it comes to US influence.
This, after the American intervention and subsequent selective withdrawals under both Bush and Obama administrations, created an untenable and extremely volatile, fractious landscape – that most of the region and the world has paid for. Successive interventions without preparation, occupations without institutional continuity, and withdrawals without consolidation were repeated over time by different parties. If this reminds you of the current state of Hormuz, you're not mistaken.
Before the 2003 intervention, the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project brought more than 200 Iraqi professionals into 17 working groups, and they all unanimously warned against blanket de-Baathification. They recommended restructuring the army, not dissolving it. The Pentagon, placed in charge of post-war Iraq, set that work aside. CPA under Bremer issued the two orders that would define the decade. First order - de-Baathification stripped tens of thousands of officials out of the ministries. What the State Department well understood and tried to warn against was that Baath membership was mandatory for civil servants and wasn’t an indicator of an ideological alliance. And the second order – dissolution of the military – put roughly 400,000 armed, trained and humiliated men onto the street. Washington confused ending a regime with dismantling a state, then spent some $60 billion in reconstruction funds and, at the 2007 peak, more than 170,000 troops to rebuild what it had removed in the first month.
The Obama administration committed to the 2011 withdrawal, but understanding its mechanics is critical to analysing the projected outcomes of the 2026 departure. The 2011 departure proved to be strategically premature. It removed the primary diplomatic and military check on the new government, which subsequently pursued highly authoritarian and sectarian policies. The 2011 withdrawal removed the last external constraints before the new order could stand on its own. When roughly 1,500 ISIS fighters routed Iraqi forces numbering around 30,000 on paper in Mosul in 2014, the collapse was institutional before it was military.
Iran understood Iraq better. Washington invested in systems, ministries, elections and training programmes, and planned an exit. Tehran dug in and invested in parties, clerical networks, commercial fronts and armed organisations that sit inside the state while answering outside it - a playbook it is intimately familiar with and one that they have used extensively across the region. Whilst the US treated Iraq as a mission for Iran, it was an investment in developing permanent strategic depth.
And not remarkably much like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the PMF is now deeply embedded in the IRGC ecosystem; whilst born legitimately out of Sistani’s 2014 call to defend the country, they were indispensable against ISIS, and now they exist outside the government, and, with the formation and rapid growth of the Muhandis General Company, they now have means to sustain themselves. Their numbers went from roughly 122,000 in 2021 to 238,000 in the 2023 budget. The 2024 allocation exceeded 4.5 trillion dinars, around $3.5 billion. That is not a militia at the edge of the state. It is a state-funded institution capable of resisting the state.
That is the test for what Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is attempting. To his credit, the momentum since May is real. Sadr separated Saraya al-Salam from the PMF. Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Imam Ali Brigades announced they were severing ties. The Coordination Framework endorsed the principle of weapons under state control. But some of the most powerful and influential factions have not moved. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba refuse to disarm, and Kataib Hezbollah has attached conditions that include the withdrawal of Turkish forces and the disbanding of the Peshmerga. These are terms that can’t be met by the government and current stakeholders - by design. The September deadline has already slipped to June 2027.
The war sharpened the point. Since the US-Israeli campaign against Iran began on 28 February, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed around 700 attacks on US assets across the region. One analyst’s count found that more than half of PMF brigades either conducted or supported attacks during the war, while Baghdad declared neutrality. Another front is open that is under IRGC control – and, with US withdrawal, much more lethal to regional stability.
Perhaps the bigger shift sits elsewhere. Iraqi sovereignty runs through two chokepoints, and Baghdad controls neither. The first is Hormuz. Oil funds at least 90% of the Iraqi state. Before the war, Iraq exported around 3.5 million barrels a day through the Gulf. With the Strait effectively closed, monthly oil revenue fell from $6.7 billion in February to roughly $1 billion by May. First-half export earnings came to about $18.5 billion, against an average of $154 billion a year across 2023 to 2025. The state spends around $6.5 billion a month on salaries, pensions and welfare. A rapidly bloating bureaucracy and public sector that is meant to pacify the population, even as unemployment crosses the 15% mark. The first-half deficit reached roughly 37% of spending. Domestic debt has passed 100 trillion dinars. Many public employees went unpaid for July salaries.
The challenge for the Iraqi government, beyond the sectarian tensions, challenges with Peshmarga in the North, and internal factions within the Shia militias, is that the Strait of Hormuz closure has severely limited its ability to pay the current public servants, let alone absorb 238,000 paramilitaries to progress disarmament on the agreed timelines.
The Gulf states often treat the public wage bill as untouchable. It is less a fiscal line and more a social contract, and cutting it comes with its own risks. These states often have sovereign wealth buffers measured in hundreds of billions to sustain these bills. Iraq is running the same contract without this buffer.
This is what I hope will give the US leverage over Iraq's future actions, as it continues to control the flow of oil revenue. Since 2003, Iraq’s oil revenues have passed through an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York before reaching the Iraqi system. That arrangement protects Iraqi assets. It also gives Washington a hand on the tap. The dollar restrictions of 2023, the sanctioning of banks and the dinar’s forced revaluation showed what that hand can do. Washington is leaving with its troops but hopefully will keep its most powerful instrument potent. The issue I can foresee is that financial leverage is blunt. Tighten dollar access now, with salaries already late, and you do not weaken the militias. You weaken the state, and hand the militias the story that they are defending Iraqis against American punishment. Additionally, it will be a matter of time before the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance develop the necessary financial infrastructure to take control of revenue flows,, and the effectiveness of US control will recede.
There are two key pillars that are keeping Iraq from collapsing into a full embrace of the IRGC, to a significant detriment to regional stability.
First is the nationalist movement led by Sadr, which provided a Shia nationalist counterweight to the Iran-aligned Coordination Framework. His movement won 73 seats in 2021, then walked out of parliament and boycotted the 2025 election. Into that space came Sudani’s coalition with 46 seats, and lists tied to Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Badr and Kataib Hezbollah with more than 50 between them. The Coordination Framework ended with over 175. Sadr’s decision this year to detach his armed wing from the PMF is the most interesting move in Iraqi politics. It puts pressure on every other faction to do the same. But it was made from outside parliament. The nationalist movement now holds sway mostly in the streets and mosques, and less so in legislation.
The second counterweight is the ageing Grand Ayatollah in Najaf. Sistani is 96. His steadfast rejection of Velayat al-Faqih and support for the quietist movement have kept Iranian influence at bay. Whilst the seminary can’t be overtaken by Iran, the transition of the religious authority after Sistani in Najaf will be decentralised; the risk is fragmentation: a successor who inherits the office without the authority to restrain armed factions or arbitrate among Shia parties. Much like what we are seeing in Iran - under Mojtaba, the IRGC seems to have gained supremacy with little or no control of the civilian government. Reports indicate that President Pezeshkian has tendered his resignation out of exasperation at least once recently.
Another unresolved issue this withdrawal will leave for the region to resolve is Kurdistan. Its autonomy rests on independent oil exports, a direct security relationship with Washington and its own forces. Exports through Turkey stopped in 2023 after the arbitration ruling and only resumed under federal marketing a year ago. Salaries now, after the withdrawal, will depend on Baghdad’s transfers. American security support is moving into federal channels. The irony is that the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, long a source of friction between Erbil and Baghdad, is now one of Iraq’s few working outlets while Hormuz is closed. The Kurdish corridor has become a federal lifeline as Kurdish autonomy is folded into federal control. Erbil is being subordinated to the federal state more tightly than ever, while the most heavily armed factions inside that state remain only partly subordinated. Kataib Hezbollah’s demand to disband the Peshmerga says exactly which armed force it expects to lose the argument.
From Panama City, the Donroe Doctrine is not an abstraction. American attention, capital and energy are visibly concentrating in this hemisphere. The corollary is what we are watching in Iraq: states altered by earlier American interventions are expected to carry the resulting security burden themselves.
I am sure someone in DoW thinks the model is coherent and even efficient - keep financial chokepoints, sanctions, intelligence relationships and the option of episodic force. Shed the cost of tangible presence and institutional stewardship. The model can provide some restraint, but it will not address the fragmentation caused by the 2003 orders. What Washington is withdrawing from today is not power; it is the external counterweight that stopped any single tribal armed-political network from taking over the post-2003 order.
Whilst there is little doubt that Iran-aligned networks will deepen their hold on the Iraqi state, I question the timeline being assumed on both sides. Washington is treating June 2027 as a disarmament date – a non-feasible deadline even by internal reckoning. IRGC is celebrating the exit as the moment Iraq tips into Iran’s orbit.
We don’t have to look too far - Lebanon’s Taif Agreement in 1989 required militias to disband. Every militia did, except the one that claimed the title of resistance. Thirty-five years later, the monopoly on arms is still Lebanon’s central unresolved question. Kataib Hezbollah uses the same vocabulary for the same reason.
Three signals that I am watching out for in the short term: First and foremost, the salary dates: payroll delays are the leading indicator of both political stress and the state’s capacity to buy compliance. Second, Jurf al-Sakhr: whether Baghdad actually moves to retake Kataib Hezbollah’s stronghold tells you whether June 2027 is a realistic outcome or a fantasy. Third, Treasury action on Iraqi banks: any tightening of dollar access while the state is illiquid sharply raises political, sovereign and currency risk.
In my view, we need to stop treating Iraq’s risk as a single federal block. Erbil, Baghdad and the southern oil economy now carry different risks on different timelines. The Ceyhan corridor and any land route through Syria and Jordan have become strategic, not marginal, assets. Iraq’s own prime minister put it plainly: American forces out, American companies in. That is an invitation, and it comes with the counterparty risk of a state that does not yet control everyone who carries its flag.
Iraq may end today with more formal sovereignty than at any point since 2003. The bigger question, for me, is whether it will have the fiscal means and the command authority to exercise it.
More in this area
The Mecca Pact: Buying Deterrence, Selling Ambiguity
The Kingdom, Turkey and Pakistan just signed a mutual defence pact in the middle of a live war in the region — and all three are allies of the same power whose retreat made the pact necessary. That, to me, is the key sentence…
Middle East: After the Islamabad Memorandum
I landed back in the Gulf, where the war has technically ended. The malls are full, coffee queues are long, and the only real signal of stress is on shipping maps and in bond spreads, not on the shop floor. The region is open and…
Iran Peace Deal - the reluctant hegemon and its consequences
As I read the emerging details on the rumored Iran peace agreement, it comes across as a concession disguised as diplomacy. Washington is moving toward some form of settlement or pause not because the issue has been resolved, but…