GCC Countries are paying the price for someone else's war
As I live through the macro ripple effects of Operation Epic Fury, I notice that whilst the backwards-looking damage is well documented, what interests me more is how this crisis resolves—the structural reconfiguration of energy routing, logistics infrastructure, and Gulf security architecture.
The strait will reopen in 3-4 weeks, not months.
Iran's conventional navy (IRIN + IRGC warships) was systematically destroyed in the first week. By March 1, the US had sunk 9 warships. By March 3, Al-Monitor reported the Strait of Hormuz was "clear of Iranian navy ships.” By March 5, Euronews confirmed over 30 Iranian ships sunk, including the drone carrier Shahid Bagheri and the frigate IRIS Dena. By March 11, CENTCOM said it had sunk over 60 Iranian ships in total and destroyed all four Soleimani-class warships. Asia Times reported 20 navy/IRGC ships destroyed in the first 100 hours alone, plus "hundreds" of small craft hit at their moorings. Iran's mine-laying capability is an entirely different force. The IRGC Navy operates upwards of 3,000 small fast boats. These are not warships—they are dispersed, hard to detect, and each can carry 2-3 mines. The US destroyed 16 of these minelayers on March 10, but Iran retains 80-90% of this small boat fleet. Only "a few dozen" mines have been laid so far—possibly fewer than 10 according to the Critical Threats Project—but Iran's stockpile is estimated at 2,000-6,000 mines, producible domestically and supplied by China and Russia.
To add to the challenge, the US decommissioned all four Avenger-class minesweepers from Bahrain in September 2025, and the replacements—Littoral Combat Ships—are untested in live mine countermeasures. JPMorgan estimates that Gulf producers face forced facility shutdowns if disruptions exceed 21 days. Iraq has already cut its southern output by 70%. Kuwait and Abu Dhabi are next. That sets the clock. Given the importance of this critical energy supply route—20% of the world’s energy supply and, hence, the world fuel price—and, perhaps even more importantly, to the impending midterm elections and hence for the Trump administration, the US has 3-4 weeks to impose a coerced reopening before damage becomes structural. Oil wells shut in take weeks to restart, and the consequent cascading output cuts from Iraq, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi will have a lasting impact on global energy costs. This ensures the Trump administration can't decamp without addressing the closure.
In 6-8 Months: The GCC Takes Control
This crisis has delivered a unified GCC stance against unprovoked Iranian aggression. This means accelerated defence integration—“Arab NATO lite”—is no longer theoretical. Security partnership diversification beyond the US to France, the UK, India, and China, as counterweights, becomes critical to the region's future security.
Infrastructure hardening—every GCC state fast-tracking bypass pipelines, strategic petroleum reserves, and alternative port capacity—becomes the second critical stream.
Gulf capitals entered this war as US staging grounds. They will exit demanding veto rights over operations launched from their soil. The cost is explicit: 40,000+ flights cancelled, airports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi struck by Iranian missiles, tourism in freefall, and GCC GDP growth cut 1.8 percentage points. They absorbed this for a war they did not initiate against an adversary with whom they had been normalising relations.
The security architecture emerging over the next 6-8 months will look nothing like it was on February 27. And the logistics architecture—Red Sea ports, bypass pipelines, cross-border rail, Arabian Sea staging—will be the physical infrastructure underwriting that new order.
Decades of investments by the Kingdom have put it in a very advantageous position in the current crisis. Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline—1,200 km from Abqaiq to Yanbu on the Red Sea—was built in 1981 for exactly this. Pre-crisis throughput of 2.8 million bpd, according to Aramco’s Nasser, can be pushed towards 7 million bpd capacity by converting NGL lines to crude. Yanbu terminal infrastructure, too, was quietly expanded over the past decade. King Fahd Industrial Port handles 1.3-1.5 million bpd. The South Terminal, commissioned in 2018 with 5 deep-water VLCC berths, adds 3 million bpd. Combined: 4.3-4.5 million bpd loading capacity. Saudi crude loading from Yanbu to India surged to 8.8 million barrels in 10 days—versus zero previously. The Kingdom exports 6-6.4 million bpd. Yanbu gets Saudi Arabia to ~70% of export capacity without the Strait. No other Gulf producer comes close. Saudi Arabia is emerging as the only Gulf producer capable of maintaining export flows during a Hormuz closure. That permanently reprices sovereign risk. Every Asian refiner renegotiating contracts internalises one fact: Saudi barrels from Yanbu arrive regardless. In times when war risk insurance on Gulf-transiting VLCCs is surging to 1-3% of hull value per seven days, $2-7.5 million per voyage on vessels valued at $200-300 million, compared to the pre-conflict $250,000, and charter rates have quadrupled to $800,000/day, a Yanbu loading eliminates the war risk premium entirely. Cape of Good Hope rerouting adds 3,500 nautical miles and 10-20 days. Each diverted voyage: +$1 million in fuel. Hapag-Lloyd's war-risk surcharges: $1,500-$3,500/TEU. Longer routes absorbed 2.5 million TEU of global capacity. Jeddah Islamic Port—62 berths, 7.5 million TEU capacity across four terminals, and a $1.7 billion RSGT expansion to 8.8 million TEU underway—is the Red Sea's largest container facility. It processed 6.2 million TEU in 2024. CMA CGM signed a $433 million fourth terminal deal in October 2025, a bet that now looks prescient.
That cost differential restructures buyer preferences for years, possibly permanently, for long-term offtake agreements being renegotiated right now.
The other GCC countries are not far behind. Oman's ports—Sohar, Salalah, and Duqm—sit outside the Strait on the Arabian Sea. Duqm, the centerpiece of Oman Vision 2040, offers deep-water access to the Indian Ocean, with a 1.5-million-container capacity and expanding industrial zones. Oman has positioned Duqm as a "back door" for trade, bypassing both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea chokepoints. But Iranian drones struck Duqm and Salalah's oil storage facilities. Operations resumed, yet the signal is clear: outside the strait does not mean outside the target set. Shipping expert Alfredo Busiello warned that Oman's ports face "limited ability to mitigate disruption due to the sudden spike in diverted volumes.”
The UAE, too, has ensured that the Fujairah pipeline can carry 1.5-1.8 million bpd, hitting a record 1.43 million bpd by March 5. ADNOC's underground storage caverns at Fujairah—42 million barrels across three caverns—provide a strategic buffer that no other Gulf state possesses. Combined Saudi-UAE bypass: ~6 million bpd. That leaves only Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar stranded behind the Strait.
Clearly, Saudi Arabia's position is structurally more durable. The 900 km Saudi Landbridge railway connecting Riyadh to Jeddah and King Abdullah Port, with a spur to Yanbu, is under construction. This crisis validates the Vision 2030 logistics thesis: twin-coast infrastructure that de-risks the Kingdom from chokepoint dependency. The $100 billion GCC Railway is targeted for completion in December 2030, connecting all six states. Etihad Rail's 900 km UAE network is operational for freight, with Abu Dhabi-Sohar (Hafeet Rail, 303 km) under construction. The Saudi-Kuwait rail breaks ground in 2026. Dammam-Jubail forms Saudi Arabia's eastern freight spine. Once Dammam-Ghuwaifat is complete, a three-country freight corridor from Oman to Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast becomes operational. Containers from Oman to Kuwait: under 20 hours by rail.

Before February 28, this was infrastructure planning. Now it is a strategic imperative. Land-based freight corridors connecting Red Sea and Arabian Sea ports to the Gulf hinterlands eliminate dependence on the Strait of Hormuz for containerised cargo. The Fujairah-UAE-Saudi rail corridor creates a multimodal bypass architecture that did not exist even conceptually five years ago.
Iran will be isolated as even allies like China join the GCC states and OECD countries admonish them over unprovoked attacks. Russia, whilst providing rhetorical support, is staying away from any direct support, with Chinese leverage over them proving to be a very useful instrument.
I firmly believe GCC countries will be back on track with their economic trajectories—and not in competition with each other but working together, bringing the “Cooperation” back into the Gulf Cooperation Council.
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