US, CHINA AND TRADE · 18 MAY 2026 · 6 MIN READ

Two leaders. Two crises. Zero structural change.

Anyone who has watched diplomatic summits over the years knows most produce less than their press releases suggest. I feel the Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing last week underwhelmed those already very low expectations, producing less than most.

Both leaders claimed "great success", with Trump calling it "fantastic" and Xi declaring a "landmark" visit and touting a new framework of "constructive strategic stability". State media on both sides filed the expected despatches. Markets, as expected, read through the details and pulled back — Boeing fell more than 4% when the announced 200-jet order came in at less than half of the 500 planes pre-positioned in analyst models. That single number tells one everything about the actual weight of what was agreed.

I think the media, for once, got it right – Reuters called it "pageantry over policy." The New York Times said it fell short of already lowered expectations. Al Jazeera ran a headline noting that China and the US couldn't even agree on what they had agreed on. China's Ministry of Commerce labelled all outcomes "preliminary", with no timelines, volumes, or confirmed counterparty commitments on the Chinese side. If you strip away the ceremony, there is no grand bargain. This was an expensive photo-op with philosophical footnotes.

My take is that both men arrived at Zhongnanhai carrying domestic weight they didn't want to acknowledge.

Trump is governing with a 30% approval rating. Gas sits around $4 per gallon—a number the White House had promised would fall below $3 "in a few more weeks" back in March. That prediction has proven comprehensively wrong. The Iran war — "Operation Epic Fury" — launched in late February as a surgical campaign has been a disaster, with Brent crude spiking past $114 a barrel and staying structurally elevated. With midterms seven months out, Republican strategists are now publicly showing their alarm. 60% of Americans disapprove of Trump's economic handling. His net approval of the cost of living is -41.

The Iran conflict has effectively removed around 20% of global oil supply from the market due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. According to Oxford Economics, if oil averages $140 per barrel for two months, parts of the global economy could tip into a mild recession. Eurozone growth projections are already revised down to 0.9% for 2026 in the adverse scenario; US growth rates are being revised down; and India has taken almost a full 100 bps off its economic growth projections. The ECB held rates steady with a view to raising them. While Lagarde publicly rejected the word "stagflation", most European businesses paying $120 oil are unlikely to agree.

In the US, Kevin Warsh, confirmed as Fed Chair last week by a 54-45 vote, inherits an institution that has run above its 2% inflation target for five consecutive years. April CPI came in at 3.8%. Wholesale prices surged 6% in the same month. The 2-year Treasury has broken above 4%, sending a clear signal that markets believe the rate is too low, not too high! Warsh’s nomination was built on an AI productivity narrative, projecting lower inflation, a direct contrast to what he actually inherits: a record-bloated balance sheet, M2 at record levels, asset prices inflated by a decade of QE, and a velocity of money that has halved since 2008. Complicating this further: Trump wants rate cuts, while the bond market is pricing hikes. This tension will define the next 18 months of US monetary policy and, by derivation, the global economy, regardless of pomp and dance in Beijing.

It's not that Xi came to the table any stronger. China cut its 2026 GDP target to 4.5-5%, its lowest ambition since the early 1990s. An unusual acknowledgement from Premier Li Qiang, who described a bleak environment for businesses and said local governments were missing payroll, was a strong signal of economic distress. Retail sales grew just 1.9% year-on-year through April. The property sector remains a drag. Youth unemployment is rising outside the southern manufacturing belt.

China, too, is suffering severely from energy exposure in the Iran conflict, which will only ratchet up as the strait remains closed. Beijing acquired over 90% of Iran's oil exports in 2024, and a majority of its broader crude imports transits through the Strait of Hormuz. China has been forced to instruct its largest state refiners to halt fuel exports. The conflict Xi privately opposes is simultaneously costing him energy security and industrial margins.

The bigger question for me has been the military one — the one that Foreign Ministry language cannot conceal. Xi's five-year purge of senior PLA generals, culminating in January with the removal of General Zhang Youxia, has left the military in the hands of new, inexperienced leaders. Brookings noted that these purges were aimed at ensuring Xi's absolute political control — a goal that carries inherent risks to operational and projection capabilities. The PLA has not engaged in a full-scale conflict in over four decades. Its military-industrial output has scaled dramatically and with genuine sophistication, but it has now been stress-tested in several proxy theatres, including, but not limited to, Pakistan and Iran, and the results have been underwhelming. Chinese air defence systems, including HQ-9B and YLC-8E radars, failed to intercept incoming strikes. Issues with electronic warfare, integration, and guidance were observed across all theatres. 'Analysts' consensus has been less than complimentary: China has scaled the military-industrial complex in a record time frame, but its export-grade kit underperforms US-standard equivalents in real combat conditions, particularly against stealth platforms and coordinated electronic warfare.

This has a direct geopolitical consequence. China's inability to intervene meaningfully on behalf of Iran, Venezuela, or Pakistan — allies where its leverage was theoretically exercisable — has exposed the gap between China's stated superpower ambitions and its actual power-projection capacity. Beijing frames its restraint as strategic wisdom. I believe foreign policy mandarins in allied capitals can see through the claim.

White House’s declaration of victory includes several trivial, if not outright empty, wins: potential Boeing order for 200 aircraft; increased agricultural purchases (previously committed in October 2025, not re-baselined); discussion of Nvidia chip access for ten Chinese firms (chips, that China hasn’t bought even when restrictions were removed); a commitment to a "Board of Trade" and "Board of Investment" (described by China's Ministry of Commerce as preliminary); and a vague framework of "constructive strategic stability" over three years.

Xi has also declared victory to his population — by claiming to have drawn a sharp public line on Taiwan during his opening remarks — warning that mismanagement could place the entire bilateral relationship "in great jeopardy". Trump made no commitments on Taiwan and declined Xi's offer to mediate with Tehran, leaving the Strait of Hormuz entirely open. Xi’s team jumped on the US delay of a $14 billion arms sale to Taipei pending the summit as a major concession. Xi's "Thucydides Trap" invocation was a weak warning dressed as philosophy. Xi has been using this reference since at least 2014. However, a China unable to intervene militarily in any of the active theatres where its allies have been targeted — it is a capability-constrained, inflated philosophical posture.

Nothing substantive that affects the global economy or security emerged from Beijing.

The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed. Iranian energy infrastructure is damaged, and it remains militarily poised to continue attacking its neighbours with impunity, further putting critical energy resources at risk. Oil will remain structurally elevated until the conflict produces a durable resolution — which Trump's refusal to engage Beijing's mediation offer makes less likely, not more. The recent escalation by an attempted attack on the Barakah nuclear plant in the UAE shows the dangerous trajectory that this conflict can continue to take.

Taiwan policy is exactly where it was before the trip. The arms sale is deferred. China has issued its warnings. Trump has made no commitments to Taiwan. Taiwan feels no safer.

Global trade architecture is unchanged. The trade truce from October 2025 holds, but its terms remain undocumented — as of January 2026, there was still no formal written agreement, giving both sides interpretive latitude they will use when convenient. The "Board of Trade" proposed in Beijing has a negligible probability of producing a structural outcome.

Beijing was a grand theatre — two domestically constrained leaders affirming that they prefer not to escalate, without either having the political or military capital to restructure the underlying dynamics.

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