The Donroe Doctrine’s bill has come due
Two regions just watched the same lesson arrive from opposite directions.
On September 16th, the US House voted 262 to 159 to authorise tariffs of up to 100% on the world’s largest buyers of Russian oil. India sits second on that list. Within a day, New Delhi’s Ministry of External Affairs had signalled—carefully, but unmistakably—that the fallout wouldn’t stay contained to trade. It would spill into “the wider India-US relationship". That is clearly diplomatic language of a government choosing its words more precisely than usual.
Three days later, Reuters reported that US officials had met Houthi representatives in Muscat, securing a pledge to leave American and Israeli vessels alone in the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia got left out of this. Riyadh’s request for direct US military backing against renewed Houthi strikes was, by the same reporting, declined.
In both cases, the message was clear—Washington is no longer underwriting their security and market access the way it once did. The “Donroe Doctrine”—the Monroe Doctrine reborn for a president who treats the Western Hemisphere as the theater worth contesting and everywhere else as a transactional leverage for political expediency.
The doctrine proscribes hemispheric assertion—pressure on Panama, Greenland, Mexico, and Venezuela—not a formal abandonment of Asia or the Middle East, but diplomatic and military resources are finite and are focused on reasserting control over your own hemisphere. That’s simple arithmetic of the Donroe Doctrine, and both India and the Gulf are now living inside it.
Early in a crisis-response engagement years ago, I watched a room change mid-meeting. The client’s principal Western patron had just attached a political condition to what had always been an unconditional security relationship. Nobody used the word "diversify". Officials simply started asking different questions—alternative suppliers, alternative settlement currencies, and alternative guarantors for contingencies nobody had needed to plan for a year earlier. The relationship didn’t end that day or end at all! It just stopped being the default, and once that happens, the governments start pricing the relationships. I feel I’m watching that same shift now, from a distance, across two very different capitals.
In the Gulf, the situation has been building up for years, and this month made it visible. A constrained posture on Iran, even through proxy escalation. Now a reported preference for private understandings with the Houthis over open backing for a treaty partner under direct attack—something unthinkable a few years ago.
China has stepped into the void conveniently, not dramatically or even methodically—its current position has been gifted to it by the US domestic political agenda. Its trade with the six GCC states passed roughly $290 billion in 2024, and trade with the wider Arab world topped $407 billion the same year. The Middle East supplied about half of China’s crude imports in 2025. This doesn't mean Gulf states are jumping onto the Beijing bandwagon over Washington. They’re pricing both, the way one prices counterparties whose reliability you can no longer take for granted, in this current version of chaotic geopolitical equilibrium.
India’s version of the same story runs longer. For most of the last twenty years, Washington courted New Delhi as the natural counterweight to China across the Indo-Pacific—the Quad was the institutional expression of that bet. The 2025 Quad leaders’ summit in India was due to host collapsed when Washington skipped the leaders’ level. Pakistan’s army chief got an unprecedented White House lunch the same year. India, by contrast, barely registers in the current administration’s published strategic thinking.
Successive punitive tariffs have unwound this relationship. 50% levy charged to India—25% from August 2025, and another 25% penalty for Russian oil purchases—making it the highest rate applied to any major US trading partner. With the Supreme Court striking down the underlying legal authority, the administration replaced it with a flat 10% tariff, which is where it sits now. I don’t believe the 100% tariff threat on the president’s desk will be fully invoked. It is more of a lever than a decision—India cuts Russian purchases, and the number comes down. I believe New Delhi has learned not to plan around perceived issues; it will be punished for next quarter, or around how the tariffs will be applied. I don’t think India will fight back because the trade asymmetry makes New Delhi’s restraint rational, not weak: India sold the US roughly $86.5 billion in goods last year, about 2.2% of GDP—considerable, mostly in gems, textiles, and leather, but not existential at the macro level. Analyst estimates of the growth hit from the 50% tariff regime cluster between 0.2 and 0.6 percentage points. Painful in specific export towns, irrelevant in aggregate.
What India can’t do is retaliate symmetrically—it buys less than half of what it sells the US, so a tariff war is one it’s structurally guaranteed to lose on volume. It reached for tools that are subtle and hard to litigate: a competition case against Apple with exposure reportedly as high as $38 billion, calculated on global turnover; data-localisation rules; and an App Store economy that penalises American platforms. India’s leverage over US tech firms and OEMs is real but bounded. In revenue terms, India is 2-3% for most big tech players today, but its user base, ad market, and manufacturing role make it strategically important and one of the few growing markets globally. The Indian market grew by about 20% across Google, Meta and Apple. Pushing digital sovereignty through targeted localisation, competition enforcement, and infrastructure standards could create real leverage that India needs. If India overplays its hand, it risks slower investment, delayed product cycles, and more intense lobbying against Indian positions.
The real respite for India comes from the EU-India trade agreement, concluded in January, which cuts tariffs on 96.6% of EU exports to India and eliminates them on 90% of Indian goods entering Europe immediately, rising to 93% within seven years — precisely the labour-intensive categories, textiles, leather, and gems, that absorbed the worst of the US shock. It hasn’t entered into force yet, but the capacity decisions it’s already driving don’t have to wait for ratification.
Defence tells a similar story, with a longer runway. SIPRI’s most recent five-year data puts Russia’s share of India’s arms imports at 36%, down from 55% a decade earlier and 72% the decade before that — with France now supplying 28%, anchored by a $7.5 billion naval Rafale order signed last spring. Nobody is “replacing” Moscow. India is building a supplier base deliberately resistant to any single capital’s bad mood.
Here is the most interesting part, and I think most commentary on the topic misses it: just as with the GCC countries, this hedge is quietly deepening India’s exposure to China, not reducing it. Imports from China hit a record $131.6 billion this past fiscal year, pushing the trade deficit with Beijing past $112 billion and making China India’s largest trading partner, ahead of the US. India’s flight from dependence on Washington is landing it in a different, arguably less comfortable dependence. That contradiction is making Indian officials deeply uncomfortable, even as the two Asian giants attempt a cautious rapprochement.
Here is what matters most: none of this will reverse easily, because the politics driving it aren’t really about India or the Gulf. Project 2025’s blueprint explicitly calls for reassessing NATO and reviewing US participation in multilateral bodies — separate from, though philosophically aligned with, the baseline and reciprocal tariffs imposed by executive order in April 2025. On the American left, a parallel scepticism toward foreign entanglement runs through the same instinct from the opposite direction: less appetite for open-ended overseas commitment, more focus at home.
And global perception has already shifted: a median of 43% across 34 countries expressed confidence in Biden’s handling of world affairs in 2024, against 28% for Trump — a gap too wide to call marginal. Confidence in Trump crept up to 34% the following year, across a narrower set of countries, but stayed well below where Biden had left it. 40%, across that same 2024 panel, said American democracy was no longer a model worth following. Whatever administration comes next inherits that erosion. Reputational damage doesn’t reset on an election cycle.
If you’re pricing risk into India or Gulf exposure on the old assumption of quiet, durable US backing, reprice the volatility, not just the headline number — the terms will keep moving with Washington’s domestic politics rather than with anything either government does. For India-US trade flows, the EU tariff schedule is already dated and already shaping where new capacity gets directed. These decisions are being made now, against current reality; manufacturers and exporters are waiting for a hoped-for stabilisation in Washington.
For allies across the Indo-Pacific or the Gulf, the lesson isn’t really about India or Saudi Arabia specifically. It’s what happens to a security architecture the moment its underwriter’s reliability becomes a variable rather than a constant. Every capital watching this is running some version of the same recalculation, most of them more quietly than New Delhi has had to.
I do believe the future administration will revisit the trade-offs made by this administration, and I don’t think the ruptures being witnessed are permanent. The world has observed these patterns before — a relationship gets declared “structurally broken” right before a recession, an election, or a change of administration quietly restores different incentives. The coalition that built the Quad, and the one that underwrote Gulf security for four decades, did so for durable strategic reasons that haven’t disappeared. An administration that currently prices relationships in tariff points and hemispheric leverage rather than in decades has suspended them.
What won’t reset as easily is what both regions have already built in the meantime. Trust rebuilds slowly. Diversified defence procurement, a signed EU trade agreement, a data-localisation regime, a quietly expanded relationship with Beijing — none of that gets dismantled just because the weather in Washington improves. That’s not sentiment. It’s infrastructure now, and infrastructure outlasts the mood that built it.
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