US, CHINA AND TRADE · 23 JUNE 2026 · 8 MIN READ

El Tigre Won't Save Us Either: The Challenge of America's Politics

Panama is my new home, and I am still in the early stages of understanding the culture, the economics, and the politics of the Americas. It is a continent I have observed from a distance for decades, enough to know the broad contours but not close enough to feel the texture.

When in the Colombian election, Abelardo de la Espriella, “El Tigre", a law-and-order outsider backed by Donald Trump, edged out the left-wing veteran Iván Cepeda in a razor-thin count, I was reminded of the cyclical nature of politics in the continent. Colombians have not “turned right". Colombians — like much of this continent — have run out of patience with a system that has, by turns and through different hands, failed to deliver the basics: security, clean growth, and institutions they can trust. And therefore, the cyclical nature of regime change continues. This becomes even more pronounced when one zooms out from Bogotá to pan over the continent. Brazil flirted with Bolsonaro’s brand of nationalist disruption before returning to Lula – only to find that return delivering its own disappointments. El Salvador’s Bukele has concentrated power while filling mega-prisons and posting crime-reduction numbers that have made the region’s technocrats visibly uncomfortable. Argentina elected Milei on a chainsaw-and-dollarise platform so radical it would have been considered political fiction five years ago. Peru is drifting in a similar direction.

But this is not a “global far-right wave” as some commentators have noted. Latin America’s right-populist surge is structurally different from Europe’s. European far-right movements are largely nativist — anti-immigration, anti-Brussels, and defensive about cultural identity. Latin America’s equivalent is almost never nativist. It is anti-corruption, anti-oligopoly, and anti-state-capture. The enemy is not the foreigner. The enemy is the political and capitalistic class. To better understand the difference, one has to look at the historical economic data.

Latin America’s economic history reveals a picture of lagging development and poor governance. Even though, in absolute terms, per-capita incomes are now roughly five times higher than they were in 1900, the gap to advanced economies has barely shifted. Latin America sat at around 14% of US per-capita income at the turn of the twentieth century, and it remains near that same level through the 1990s.

Inequality has a strong correlation to that. Historical reconstructions of Gini coefficients show Latin America joining the “rich-country inequality club” by World War I — and then going further, becoming the world’s most unequal major region as inequality climbed through the mid-twentieth century, even as it fell in the US and Europe. By the 1980s, World Bank analysis had a stark finding: the poorest 20% in many countries received roughly 4% of total income, and poverty actually rose during most recession episodes.

Today, the numbers are marginally better, but not by much. The World Bank’s latest regional data counts one in four people in Latin America and the Caribbean living below the $6.85 per day poverty line — an improvement from around 50% at the millennium, but still a striking number for a region that has had a century of governments promising transformation. The regional Gini sits near 50, barely moving in a decade; the 2022 reading was 49.9 — still among the highest in the world.

IMF analysis of Latin American macro volatility finds that over 70% of volatility in real GDP per capita growth over the past century has been driven by country-specific policy shocks. Governments — not external forces, not commodity prices alone — have been the primary source of economic instability. The system keeps shaking ordinary households.

The right and left in Latin America have each had their eras. Both have a partially correct diagnosis of what ails the continent. The tragedy is that both poles continue to compound the issue rather than deliver a cure.

On the one hand, right-nationalist and oligarchic regimes — often military-backed through the mid-twentieth century — could deliver episodes of commodity-driven growth. The postwar decades saw real expansion in several Andean and Southern Cone economies. But these regimes entrenched elites, tolerated and frequently institutionalised corruption, and left inequality structurally untouched or worse. They also corrupted the democratic institutions: legislatures bypassed, courts packed, opposition prosecuted. The growth they generated was real but narrow, accruing to those already positioned to capture it.

And on the other end, the socialist experiments at times produced some improvements through redistribution, particularly through the early 2000s commodity supercycle. Between roughly 2003 and 2013, GDP per capita in the region grew at around 2.1% annually, and poverty fell from approximately 50% to 30%. Real gains. But they generally over-promised redistribution without building the productive base required to fund it. Fiscal discipline was sacrificed for demagoguery and ideology. When commodity prices turned, the arithmetic collapsed. By the mid-2010s, poverty reduction had stalled, and the region had slipped back into a low-growth trap.

Venezuela is the cautionary tale. All the structural fragilities that economists had flagged for decades — oil dependence, weak institutions, volatile policy — were taken to their logical end under Chávez and Maduro. Redistribution running at the expense of productive capacity, state capture replacing institutional governance, distributional politics fusing with the destruction of production: the result is not a failed experiment. It is a civilisational and social decline. The region’s other left-wing governments have not gone this far, but Venezuela remains the cautionary example.

This is the tragedy of what is clearly one of the most promising economic regions: each side of the political spectrum dilutes the institutions to push its agenda, rewards its coalition, and treats the democratic apparatus as a tool of incumbency rather than a constraint on power. It is no surprise that the next generation of voters reaches for the outsider who promises to clean up the system with sharper tools. As a result, the OECD’s trust survey for Latin America finds that only around a third of respondents report high confidence in their governments — well below the OECD average. UNDP and IDB data show that institutional trust declined at an accelerating rate after the global financial crisis.

Economists studying the relationship between corruption perception and redistribution preferences have found something counterintuitive: people who believe the state is corrupt become less willing to support tax-and-transfer schemes, even when they are poor and would benefit from them. They assume the money will not reach them. This anti-establishment construct should sound familiar to us; it is the same swamp rhetoric that worked for Donald Trump in the US- a simple, compelling narrative: “The system is corrupt, I will clean it up.”

I want to be careful not to over-extrapolate from a small sample or exaggerate, but since Panama is now my home, I would be remiss if I did not talk about the obvious exception.

Panama has done something the rest of the region has failed to do: sustain disciplined, market-oriented governance while investing in the physical and institutional infrastructure that attracts global capital and genuinely raises living standards.

Panama’s GDP per capita stood at approximately $7,000 in 2000. It sits at around $16,000 today – more than doubling in twenty-five years, against a regional average that moved far less impressively. The country has grown at an average rate of 5–6% annually over much of that period, among the fastest sustained rates in the Western Hemisphere. It has delivered real infrastructure and capital projects – the canal expansion, completed in 2016 at a cost of around $5.25 billion, opened the country to full post-Panamax shipping volumes and materially repositioned Panama in global logistics architecture. Tocumen International Airport has been expanded into the primary hub in Central America. A metro system now serves a city that most observers would not have associated with urban rail infrastructure a decade ago.

World Bank data shows Panama’s extreme poverty rate declining from around 17% in 2001 to under 5% by the early 2020s — one of the steeper reductions in the region. FDI, too, has consistently run at 6–8% of GDP, a level that reflects investor confidence. Panama is not without its issues. Inequality still remains high, with Gini hovering at around 48–49, and the informal economy is large. But the country is working on these and is now creating transparency into its financial system – strengthening its international banking hub position. Panama proves the continent has the template. The question is whether its neighbours will ever hold a disciplined government long enough and trust it enough to let the model compound.

The World Bank’s 2026 regional outlook describes Latin America as “stuck in a low-growth trap,” with projected growth of around 2.1%. The IMF’s Western Hemisphere view projects growth at 2.3–2.6%, with only modest improvement and continued volatility. This is the environment in which El Tigre’s Colombia, Milei’s Argentina, and Bukele’s El Salvador are succeeding.

For operators and investors, this is what I would take away: the ballot box in the region continues to function as a mechanism for punishing failure, but the punishment produces rotation rather than a cure. Electing an outsider does not rebuild a corrupted institution. Implementing shock therapy does not rewrite the informal economy overnight. Filling prisons does not resolve the inequality.

Both socialists and strongman regimes tend to take advantage of this desolation. I have seen governments in South-east Asia and Africa do this with every new cycle: “this time the technocrats have it,” "This time the generals are disciplined," and "This time the outsider is different.” The data and the institutional history suggest a harsher reading. Whilst right-populist cures often reproduce the disease by centralising power, bypassing legislatures, and militarising public order. The left-populist cures, on the other hand, have often blown up the fiscal base and used patronage to hold coalitions together in lieu of productive policy.

Until the region simultaneously delivers sustained per-capita growth, genuine inequality reduction, and a rebuilt institutional floor — three things that reinforce each other and that no single government in a single term can accomplish alone — the pendulum will continue its arc.

El Tigre’s Colombia is not the end of the story. It is another rotation in a long cycle where both left and right pledge to save the state, then quietly erode it. The continent is not short of talent, resources, or economic potential. It lacks the political patience and institutional resilience to let a disciplined approach compound. Panama has demonstrated that the pieces can go together. As I settle into my new neighbourhood, that is the question I keep returning to: not whether it is possible — it clearly is — but why, after a century of evidence, the lesson remains so hard to hold.

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