Hemispherism: The Next American Doctrine - Why the US Is Choosing Regional Dominance Over Global Leadership
It is critical to review the new US National Security Strategy document in some detail in light of the administration's actions in Venezuela and Panama, as well as ongoing discussions regarding Greenland. The elevation of the Western Hemisphere to top regional priority—displacing Europe and the Indo-Pacific—signals fundamental American retreat from universal hegemony toward regional dominance.
Removing Maduro, forcing Panama's February withdrawal from China's Belt and Road Initiative, supporting Milei in Argentina's and its withdrawal in December 2023 from BRICS, and in the very near future, Cuba's potential economic strangulation pushing it toward collapse, indicate a deliberate strategy - something this administration is rarely credited with. The NSS explicitly states the US will "deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities" in the hemisphere and calls for "readjustment of our global military presence... away from theaters whose relative import to American national security has declined."
Latin America and the Caribbean represent $11.1 trillion in purchasing power (7.3% of global GDP). Securing this market without Chinese interference offers the US a captive trading bloc while positioning Mexico and Central America as geopolitically uncontentious manufacturing alternatives—lessons from US experiences with China's overexposure are now being systematically applied.
Mexico has displaced China as America's largest trading partner. With $6-8/hour fully loaded labor costs, manufacturing clusters in automotive (Nuevo León) and electronics (Baja California), plus USMCA facilitation, nearshoring delivers supply chain resilience without the Taiwan Strait risk premium. There are significant immediate benefits: shorter logistics, aligned time zones, reduced environmental impact, and diminished vulnerability to geoeconomic fragmentation.
China-LAC trade exploded from $8 billion (2000) to $415 billion (2023)—15.2% annual growth versus 4% for US-LAC trade over the same period. Reversing Chinese commercial penetration does not call for just security measures; however, sustained economic engagement and infrastructure investment. The US has historically underdelivered in the region.
This also calls for a new distribution of the world order burden costs - data reveals disproportionate American burden-sharing. The US provides 22% of UN regular budget and 26% of peacekeeping budgets while furnishing 30% of all OECD development assistance ($63.3 billion in 2024)—yet it represents 4.2% of the world population. It funds 24 of 53 major multilateral institutions and maintains 16.5% IMF voting share, enabling veto power.
US allies, which control 36% of global economic output, contribute merely 24% of global military spending. G7 aid faces projected cuts of $44 billion by 2026, with the US accounting for $33 billion. This asymmetry has been economically and politically unsustainable.
However, this is not the isolationist US of the pre-WWII, and any analogy warrants caution. Unlike 1920s-30s isolationism that preceded catastrophic conflict, today's version is selective retrenchment within functional alliances (NATO, AUKUS, QUAD). The question isn't about the US abandoning allies, but about burden-sharing becoming genuinely reciprocal rather than merely rhetorical. Past US attempts at burden redistribution—Nixon Doctrine, post-Cold War peace dividend—ultimately failed when crises demanded American reengagement. This time, Europe confronts a starker choice. NATO allies now all exceed 2% GDP defense threshold, but Trump demands 5%. Meeting this while assuming greater Ukraine support and independent Russian deterrence requires €650-800 billion additional spending over four years—3.5% of EU GDP by 2028-29. European defense industries lack capacity, political unity continues to evade, and economic growth disappoints. France and Poland show greater willingness than Germany.
China has so far lacked the will to project its military strength; this could change. As the largest UN peacekeeping contributor among the P5 members, with an 8,000-strong standby force, Beijing has demonstrated its capacity for military operations other than war. Reluctance to project combat power—evidenced by the absence during the Venezuela crisis despite substantial assets at risk—suggests ideological constraints dictated by its model of economic statecraft without security guarantees.
It is the small and medium powers that face the starkest of adjustments. Countries like India that leveraged Sino-American competition must now secure independent platforms for power projection. Japan, South Korea, and Australia must now test the reliability of US defense commitments as American attention pivots westward. AUKUS and QUAD provide institutional frameworks but no guarantee of automatic intervention.
Sub-Saharan Africa, too, will have challenges in arbitrating trade splits between the US-EU and China blocs and will face amplified geoeconomic alignment. Suffering from high debt burdens, commodity dependence, and limited integration into global value chains, these economies are extremely vulnerable. FDI to developing regions has dropped by 15% since 2021, and I would expect further declines. The risk isn't bipolar Cold War alignment but exclusion from both spheres as great powers prioritize core interests and see little to no value in the region.
The multilateral system demands reconfiguration. US contributions function as de facto subsidies enabling these institutions to operate. As Washington retrenches, either major economies step forward with commensurate funding—unlikely given domestic constraints—or institutions contract. Current reform in IMF/World Bank governance should accelerate, and emerging markets should be given a greater voice, but with a greater contribution.
I think the biggest change will come from recalibrations of markets, sovereign debt pricing, and equity valuations as they move away from embedded assumptions about stable American security guarantees. Repricing this risk premium will create significant market fluctuations as investors distinguish between nations with genuine strategic autonomy versus those dependent on eroding US commitments.
The nation demonstrating political courage to assume burdens the US sheds will harvest overextended influence this century. Europe possesses an economic base but lacks political will. China commands resources but ideological inhibitions constrain military projection. The resulting environment disadvantages any nation lacking independent diplomatic, economic, or military weight.
We are witnessing not American decline but American choice: to dominate regionally rather than lead globally. Whether smaller powers evolve by strategic autonomy or fragment into spheres of influence determines if this transition proves orderly or chaotic.
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