US, CHINA AND TRADE · 18 JANUARY 2026 · 7 MIN READ

Greenland and the Reshaping of Global Order

Looking back at the first year of Trump's second administration brings mixed feelings—fatigue foremost among them.

Some disruptions were overdue. Allies needed pressure to shoulder more responsibility. Multilateral agencies required accountability. The global trading architecture demanded recalibration to accommodate China's rise and the emerging multipolar reality. These shifts, breaking seven decades of conventional diplomacy, forced acknowledgment of new ground realities. Western powers and emerging nations alike have been compelled to reassess defense and trade arrangements in light of the US pivot—retreat from the East, aggression in the West.

Most governments adopted a placating approach to Trump's tariff regime, assuming that inflation pressures and the November 2026 mid-term elections would bring moderation. Several proclamations were dismissed as fantastical—Greenland acquisition, sudden tariff strikes, and even the pursuit of the Nobel Prize. Trump's pleasure in flouting conventions often led observers to dismiss his statements as offhand banter. But swift action in the Americas—Venezuela's regime change via military strikes on January 3, financial leverage over Argentina through a $20 billion currency swap supporting Milei, threats against Panama's Canal, accompanied by a BlackRock deal to acquire port operations—and now the Greenland standoff demonstrate this administration takes these assertions seriously.

Critical long-term effects are reshaping the world.

Western Accountability and the NATO Stress Test

Western powers and US allies are assuming greater accountability for security and the economy. EU countries standing unified against the US administration—deploying troops from France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the Netherlands to Greenland on January 14-15—represents a watershed. This creates a visual standoff against their most important ally under "Operation ArcticEndurance". Trump responded on January 17 with 10% tariffs on eight European nations, effective February 1, escalating a crisis that fundamentally tests NATO's Article 5 collective defense provisions. The treaty contains no mechanism for one NATO member attacking another. Denmark has pledged to invoke Article 5 if the US invades Greenland, creating an unprecedented situation where the alliance must defend against an internal threat. Only 8% of Americans support a Greenland invasion, according to YouGov polling, yet the administration refuses to rule out military force.

Trade Realignment Accelerates

Fatigue with US tariff volatility is driving outreach to new trading networks. The EU and Mercosur signed their trade agreement on January 17, 2026—27 years after negotiations began in 1999, not 24 as often reported. The deal covers 780 million people and nearly a quarter of global GDP. That this concluded now, despite decades of French agricultural opposition and bureaucratic inertia, signals urgency to diversify away from US economic coercion. Germany and India are resetting relations after years of friction. Chancellor Merz's January 12-13 visit to India—his first trip to Asia as Chancellor—brought 23 German CEOs and yielded agreements on defense industrial cooperation, semiconductor partnerships, and renewable energy. Bilateral trade reached $50 billion in 2024, representing over 25% of India's trade with the EU. Both countries are pushing for the India-EU Free Trade Agreement, expected to be signed January 27, 2026—potentially the EU's largest trade deal. Canada and India formalized a reset in October 2025 after the relationship collapsed following allegations about the Nijjar killing in September 2023. Foreign Ministers issued a joint statement outlining a "New Roadmap" covering trade, critical minerals, energy dialogue, and the reinstatement of High Commissioners. The CEO Forum will reconvene in early 2026.

China's Strategic Opening

The biggest beneficiary may be China. As countries realize the world's second-largest economy offers the next-largest market to offset economic challenges, China is moving from confrontation to selective normalization. Canada's Mark Carney announced January 15 an agreement reducing the 100% tariff on Chinese EVs to 6.1% for up to 49,000 vehicles annually—reversing the 2024 policy imposed at Biden's request. Carney stated China has become a "more predictable partner" than the US, and framed the deal as Canada's path to reducing economic dependence on its southern neighbor. India, too, is normalizing relations with China after Modi's first visit to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin in seven years on August 31, 2025. Border patrols have resumed, direct flights restart in September 2025, and visa requirements will be eased. India's realization is pragmatic: a May 2025 confrontation with Pakistan exposed military vulnerabilities, making a two-front war with both Pakistan and China untenable. This is in clear light of Western support for counterbalancing China is dissipating as the US National Security Strategy released December 4, 2025, explicitly prioritizes the Western Hemisphere. This strategy formalizes the "Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine," calling for US preeminence in the Americas and a "readjustment of global military presence...away from theaters whose relative import to American national security has declined". The document barely mentions Africa except as a source of natural resources. The Indo-Pacific receives attention, but with calls for Japan and South Korea to "play a larger role". Europe is criticized for "unrealistic expectations" regarding Ukraine and "subversion of democratic processes," blocking public desire for peace.

Energy Security Scramble

Energy security has become paramount. With the US effectively controlling Venezuelan oil—Trump stated the US would "run" Venezuela and American companies would seize and sell its oil—and Russian and Iranian oil under severe sanctions, countries are scrambling to secure supplies. Venezuela currently produces roughly 950,000 barrels per day, with the potential to increase by several hundred thousand barrels per day under US management. Canada mulls new markets for its oil, but refining and transportation constraints make this largely hypothetical. Yet from this constrained position, a $45-50 crude market is plausible. Goldman Sachs forecasts WTI could drop to $50 in Q4 2026, with Brent averaging $54-56 for the year. Whilst this scenario requires peace in Ukraine, regime change in Iran, and increased throughput from Iraq and Venezuela, in the current fragmented geopolitical landscape, none of these seems particularly unlikely.

Iraq plans to raise capacity from 4 million to 5.5 million barrels per day, targeting 6+ million by 2029. The US announced January 16 it will expand Chevron's Venezuela license, allowing cash payments instead of crude, enabling the company to sell all extracted oil. Non-OPEC+ supply is projected to grow 610,000 barrels per day in 2027, led by Brazil, Canada, Qatar, and Argentina. OPEC faces oversupply. The organization paused production increases for Q1 2026, maintaining demand growth forecasts of 1.38 million barrels per day for 2026—but this is outpaced by supply growth, creating a 2.3 million barrel per day surplus. At $50 WTI, US shale production—with breakeven prices of $50-65 per barrel—could decline by 700,000 barrels per day by Q4 2026, providing a price floor but creating fiscal pressures for debt-laden producers. This adds to OPEC's concerns. OPEC already contends with 105 shadow fleet vessels under sanctions, Russian production beating expectations despite sanctions, and the potential for Iranian supply disruption—or sudden increases if regime change occurs.

Security Architecture Under Scrutiny

The second biggest concern facing nations is security. With the US hegemon in demonstrable retreat to the Western Hemisphere, they must reevaluate relationships with large adversaries. NATO's effectiveness will face increased scrutiny in the coming year, potentially fundamentally reshaping the alliance and its constitution. The Greenland crisis exposes this: there is no treaty provision for expelling or suspending a misbehaving member. Countries can leave voluntarily but cannot be forcibly removed. AUKUS, QUAD, and other defense formations must be tested against the new National Security Strategy to assess US resolve. The December 2025 strategy calls for "targeted deployments to secure the border and defeat the cartels" and a hemisphere "free from hostile foreign incursions or ownership of key assets". Military attention shifts toward the Americas and away from other theaters. Denmark lost 45 soldiers in Afghanistan on a per-capita basis among the highest casualty rates of any NATO country fighting there. They provided F-16s to Ukraine after Russia's 2022 invasion. An invasion of Greenland would mean permanent loss of a strategically important partner on shared security interests.

Past "This Too Shall Pass" Will Not Work

None of these dynamics can be resolved with "this too shall pass." With more than three years remaining and increased usage of presidential executive powers, Trump has tested the conventions of government apparatus—and the apparatus has been found wanting.

These are consequential times. Carney may be right that we are witnessing a new world order emerge, catalyzed by US government policy. Against hope, I look for an assertive and ascending EU to fill the vacuum. A natural power equilibrium creating a more stable environment for future generations. The peace dividend passed to the next generation.

But power abhors a vacuum. Europe's response to the Greenland crisis—troops deployed, tariffs imposed, unity demonstrated—suggests the beginnings of strategic autonomy. Whether this cohesion survives beyond crisis management remains uncertain. Germany's Merz visiting India with 23 CEOs signals European recognition that global partnerships can no longer run exclusively through Washington.

The question is not whether the global order is changing—that is settled. The question is whether the transition produces equilibrium or prolonged instability. Oil at $50 would devastate shale economics, reshape OPEC dynamics, and accelerate the energy transition in unpredictable ways. NATO rupture would leave European security architecture in tatters. Chinese normalization with India, Canada, and others could consolidate a parallel trading system outside US influence.

We are living through a genuine inflection point. The systems that governed global affairs since 1945—and in some cases since 1823, given the Monroe Doctrine's resurrection—are being stress-tested beyond design parameters. What emerges will define the geopolitical landscape for the next generation.

The Greenland standoff is not about Greenland. It is the crucible in which the post-American global order is being forged.

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