Debt, Inflation, and the Narrowing Room for Policy—The Rising Cost of Running the State
I listened to Andy Burnham’s first Labour conference speech as Prime Minister, as he set out a larger role for the British state: a national care service, more council housing, changes to pensions and greater public involvement in key services, with some relief that the speech went on to outline fiscal rules and the need to reduce borrowing and debt, acknowledging that the programme could not proceed as quickly as some supporters wanted.
Coincidentally, on the other side of the planet, on the same day, the Reserve Bank of Australia raised its cash rate by 25 basis points to 4.60%, the highest level in 15 years. The decision came less than a fortnight after the Federal Reserve, under Kevin Warsh, raised its target range by 25 basis points to 3.75–4.00%.
The wider context to take this all in is United States federal debt stock crossing $40 trillion in August and continuing to rise, alongside a global investment boom in computing infrastructure that is absorbing capital, energy, metals, and specialised equipment on an exceptional scale.
I can’t help but see these vectors intersecting, creating a much more complex fiscal and monetary landscape for the next decade.
Five forces driving the macroeconomic environment: record sovereign debt, circular leverage around technology investment, trade and sanctions fragmentation, structurally continued inflation and a rising premium on long-dated government bonds. They are not running in parallel; instead, they cut across each other, and each makes the others harder to manage.
Higher infrastructure spending increases demand for power, commodities, and skilled labour. Trade restrictions and sanctions make supply less efficient. Continued inflation keeps central banks restrictive. Higher rates increase government interest costs. Larger deficits then require more bond issuance when investors demand greater compensation to hold long maturities. I don’t see these vectors culminating in one single identifiable crisis with a clear starting date, but the most likely outcome is a sustained increase in the baseline cost of running a government, maintaining a currency and constructing a portfolio.
My biggest concern in this developing landscape is that the buffering capacity of advanced sovereign economies has been substantially used up. Governments and central banks still have tools, but those tools are producing smaller gains at higher cost because the problem is no longer confined to one policy area.
Burnham’s programme illustrates the fiscal tension. There are reasonable arguments for parts of it. Better social care could reduce pressure on hospitals. More housing could eventually lower the housing-benefit bill. Reforming the pensions triple lock could redirect spending towards younger and more vulnerable households. But the transition still needs funding. Public sector net debt stood at £2.986 trillion at the end of August, equal to 93.8% of GDP. Britain’s 30-year gilt yield recently reached 5.948%, its highest level since 1998, while a £4.25 billion reopening of the 2056 gilt was priced at 5.8168%. New borrowing and refinancing are becoming considerably more expensive than they were during the decade after the financial crisis.
Burnham’s commitment to fiscal rules is therefore not incidental to the programme. It is part of the funding model. The unresolved issue is how the government will expand services, preserve investor confidence and avoid placing too much of the adjustment on a relatively narrow tax base.
The RBA decision reveals another part of the same problem. Its statement referred to higher energy prices following the Middle East conflict, strong demand for technology-related goods and continuing pressure on domestic capacity. Australia is tightening monetary policy while most of its inflation stems from supply-side pressures that are least responsive to interest-rate hikes. Higher rates can restrain household consumption, housing activity and business borrowing. They cannot directly increase the supply of oil, electricity, copper, transformers or advanced semiconductors. The RBA tightened because external price shocks can spread into wages, services inflation and expectations if policy remains too loose for too long.
The Fed’s September decision indicated a similar concern. Its statement said inflation remained elevated and that the quarter-point increase was intended to support a return to 2%. The increase came despite the growing interest burden on the federal government and private borrowers' sensitivity to long-term yields.
US federal debt provides the third signal. Treasury data put total outstanding debt above $40.1 trillion, with roughly $32 trillion held by the public. Treasury expects to borrow $739 billion in privately held net marketable debt during the July–September quarter and another $628 billion in the final quarter of 2026.
On 19 August, Treasury increased planned long-end liquidity-support buybacks from $2 billion to at least $4 billion per operation. Investors took comfort and long yields initially declined, but by the following day the 30-year yield had moved above its pre-announcement level. The programme does not sufficiently address the fiscal deficit or materially change the total debt stock. A $4 billion operation is about 0.012% of a publicly held Treasury market of roughly $32 trillion.
These three developments point to the same constraint from different directions. Governments need to fund more. Central banks need to restrain inflation, and investors require more compensation to provide long-term finance.
Let me reflect on the five forces I see defining the fiscal, trade, and investment environment over the next decade.
The first force is the high level and continuing growth of sovereign debt.
The IMF estimates that global gross public debt rose to almost 94% of GDP in 2025 and is likely to reach 100% by 2029. The OECD expects sovereign bond issuance among member countries to reach a record $18 trillion in 2026, compared with $12 trillion in 2022. The net effect is reduced fiscal leeway. High debt levels and rising yields gradually increase interest expenditure as existing securities mature and are refinanced. Governments then have less room for health, defence, infrastructure or tax relief without a corresponding revenue rise.
The rise in government revenues is one of my gravest concerns - especially as the demand for public spending is increasing rather than receding. Ageing populations require more health and social care. Geopolitical tension is lifting defence budgets. Energy security and industrial policy require public support. Voters facing high living costs expect relief.
Britain reflects these pressures in a concentrated form. Burnham wants to build a national care service while maintaining housing, defence and other commitments. The proposed change to the triple lock may eventually save around £15 billion a year by 2040, but the care system requires funding well before the full savings arrive. The timing gap must be covered through taxation, borrowing, spending reductions elsewhere, or stronger growth. None of these options is easy or straightforward.
The less mobile parts of the tax base already face higher housing, food, and energy costs. The most taxable pools of income and capital have much greater scope to change their behaviour, ownership structures or location to avoid these tax measures. Tax increases can raise revenue, but forecasts need to allow for those responses. I have seen this issue recur ubiquitously in national fiscal planning. Tax measures attract attention, but the more important question is how the tax base behaves over the following three to five years. Revenue assumptions fracture easily when they depend heavily on a small group with several jurisdictional choices and easy mobility.
For the United States, its reserve-currency position provides greater financing capacity, allowing it to defer fiscal adjustment. Interest expense has already become one of the largest items in the federal budget. Treasury’s own data put the cost of servicing the debt at more than $1.2 trillion in fiscal 2026, around 19% of federal spending.
The base case, to me, won’t be a funding crisis. It most likely will be an extended period in which interest costs take a larger share of public revenue, reducing governments' ability to respond to the next recession, conflict, or financial shock.
The second force that has engaged the public imagination, quite rightly, is the scale and financing of the technology infrastructure build-out.
The BIS estimates that the five largest hyperscalers will spend more than $1 trillion on related capital expenditure across 2025 and 2026. The investment includes data centres, power generation, advanced chips, cooling systems, networking equipment and grid connections. AI investments will, no doubt, raise productivity over time, supporting growth while other parts of the economy slow. In fact, as the WTO noted, strong demand for technology-related goods that helped offset some of the effects of trade restrictions during 2025.
However, the near-term resource effect differs significantly. Large data centres call for substantial electricity, copper, steel, cooling equipment, land and specialised construction labour. These projects are competing with housing, conventional industry, defence and energy transition projects for the same inputs. That is why the RBA’s reference to demand for technology-related goods is relevant beyond the sector itself. The investment boom is beginning to influence central-bank assessments of global goods prices and capacity constraints.
Apart from the inflation that resource rivalry stokes, the funding structure also deserves attention. BIS research finds that corporate bonds are becoming a more important source of finance as investment needs move beyond what operating cash flow can comfortably support. Private credit, leases and off-balance-sheet structures are also expanding. Worryingly, some of these financing arrangements are circular. Chip producers and large platforms are taking stakes in laboratories or cloud providers, which then commit to buying hardware or computing capacity from their investors. Capital provided to the customer can return to the supplier as revenue. Whilst not illegal, calculated investments can align incentives and fund infrastructure that would otherwise arrive too slowly; my concern is that several valuations and credit exposures may depend on the same assumptions about future demand. A BIS working paper published in July finds that debt and cross-ownership can increase the risk of forced sales if expected demand disappoints. A strong counterargument is that the build-out could generate enough productivity, new services, and income to justify the current spending. Whilst all of this is possible, it is important to remember that markets have been burnt before—by the Dotcom crash and the 2008 financial crisis. As such, these productivity assumptions should be approached more cautiously. The sequencing of the productivity gains and investment returns remains ambiguous at best. The financing obligations and demand for physical inputs arrive years before the full productivity gains can be demonstrated. If interest rates remain high, projects need to clear a higher return threshold. If expected revenue is delayed, the effect may spread from equity valuations into private credit, corporate bonds, utilities and property markets connected to data-centre development.
The investment boom therefore links technology policy to inflation, energy, credit markets and sovereign borrowing. It is no longer a self-contained equity-market theme.
The third force is the fragmentation of trade, investment and payments.
The WTO describes the current period as the most serious and sustained disruption to the multilateral trading system since it was established 80 years ago, although some of it was well due. Its modelling suggests that the current continuing trend of divisions into geopolitical blocs could reduce global GDP by 5.1% and exports by 18.6%. The World Bank expects trade growth to weaken further as current inventory diminishes, tariff effects on new inventory become fully visible in prices, and Middle East disruption continues to affect energy and shipping for several years. The IMF has similarly warned against geopolitical fragmentation weakening growth whilst commodity shocks lift inflation.
The practical effect is not a complete reversal of globalisation. Production often moves through another country rather than returning home, as the China+1 policy has shown. Firms add suppliers, hold more inventory, duplicate systems and accept higher compliance costs to reduce geopolitical exposure. This improves resilience in some areas but also raises the underlying cost structure.
While tariffs aim to protect selected domestic sectors, encourage investment, and reduce dependence on strategic competitors, they also typically raise costs for consumers and domestic firms that use imported inputs. The final effect is often ambiguous, leaving manufacturers less competitive and consumers worse off. Sanctions have a similar balance. They can impose real economic costs and restrict access to technology or finance. They also encourage alternative payment systems, local-currency settlement, shadow shipping networks and legal measures that block compliance with foreign sanctions. Trade routes become longer, financing becomes more specialised and inventories increase. Those adjustments appear in working capital, insurance, freight and final prices rather than in one obvious measure of fragmentation. In net terms of sovereign funding, weaker trade growth can reduce tax receipts, while strategic competition raises spending on defence, energy security, and industrial support. For central banks, the resulting price increases are difficult to offset without also weakening domestic demand. For businesses, location decisions now increasingly depend on political alignment and market access as much as on wages and logistics.
While the shift may be justified on security grounds, it is still likely to be inflationary during the transition and less efficient in a narrow economic sense.
The fourth force is an inflation process that now draws from monetary, fiscal, geostrategic and supply-side sources at the same time.
US M2 reached $23.343 trillion in August, up from $22.093 trillion a year earlier, an increase of about 5.7%. While it doesn’t drive inflation on its own, it becomes relevant when combined with large fiscal deficits and constrained supply. A higher policy rate can exist alongside higher M2 supply, particularly when government borrowing and spending continue to inject income into the private sector. The central bank can keep the brakes on with higher interest rates while the government presses the accelerator through deficit spending. The IMF’s July update expects global headline inflation to increase from 4.1% in 2025 to 4.7% in 2026 before easing in 2027. Australia provides a useful illustration. The RBA is dealing with domestic capacity pressure, but it is also responding to energy and technology-goods prices influenced by events outside Australia. Higher rates can reduce the second-round effects. They cannot remove the initial source.
The Fed faces the same problem within a more difficult fiscal context. It raised rates because inflation remained elevated, even though higher rates add over time to federal interest expenditure and private refinancing costs. Recent research in the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity argues that sustaining low long-run inflation will require stronger central-bank credibility or more credible public-debt policy to offset the economic and political pressures pushing inflation upwards.
This relationship is critical to what I am highlighting: when fiscal and monetary policy move in opposing directions, governments need to spend more on defence, social care, industrial capacity, or household support, but central banks need to restrain the demand and inflation that spending creates.
Central banks also have limits on how far they can ease when inflation remains above target. If they reduce rates mainly to contain sovereign refinancing costs or support government bond markets, investors may expect more inflation and require a higher yield on long debt. This is how fiscal pressure can begin to affect monetary credibility without any formal change to central-bank independence.
This leads to the fifth force - the higher return required to hold long-dated government debt.
A long bond yield combines expectations for future short-term rates with a term premium that compensates investors for inflation, supply, liquidity and policy uncertainty. Investors cannot observe the components perfectly, but the rise in long yields across several advanced economies suggests the required compensation has clearly increased. Britain’s 30-year gilt near 5.95% is the clearest current example. The recent 2056 gilt sale was completed successfully, so this is not a failed market. Investors remain willing to lend, they are demanding a higher return. The same pattern is visible in the United States. Long Treasury yields rose to multi-decade highs before the August buyback announcement, fell after the Treasury increased liquidity support and then recovered. The balance sheet and funding constraints of dealers, hedge funds and asset managers are affecting how much duration the market can absorb and the yield required to absorb it. Portfolio behaviour is changing. Government bonds have provided reliable diversification during the low-inflation decades precisely because growth shocks usually led to rate cuts and higher bond prices. When inflation becomes the main shock, bond and equity prices can fall together.
Higher yields are raising debt-service costs as governments refinance. Higher interest expenditure increases upcoming borrowing. Greater issuance adds to supply and places further demands on investor balance sheets. The process can continue without a failed auction or an acute crisis. The government can remain fully funded while an increasing share of revenue gets transferred to debt service. That, to me, is the most likely risk over the next several years: not immediate loss of market access, but a persistent narrowing of policy choice.
Taken together, these five forces seem to create an interconnected, challenging landscape for future monetary and economic policies.
The technology build-out raises demand for energy, materials, equipment and labour. This contributes to inflation pressure and keeps central banks restrictive. Higher rates increase financing costs for the same projects and for sovereign borrowers. Trade restrictions and sanctions reduce supply-chain efficiency and weaken parts of global growth. Governments compensate with defence spending, industrial policy and household support. Those measures add to borrowing requirements. Large sovereign issuance enters markets where investors are more cautious about inflation and duration. Long yields rise, increasing future interest costs and reducing fiscal room. As a result, governments consider tax increases, spending changes, altered issuance patterns, or pressure for easier monetary policy. Each option addresses part of the problem while shifting costs elsewhere. A tax increase can improve the fiscal balance but alter investment and location decisions for some of the larger taxpayers. A subsidy can build domestic capacity but add to debt and resource demand. A tariff can support one industry while raising costs for downstream firms and leaving consumers worse off. A rate increase can contain inflation expectations but at the cost of weakened housing and raising refinancing costs. A buyback can improve market liquidity without changing the longer-term debt trajectory, given the scale of government debt.
The common feature across this landscape is reduced shock absorption. Fiscal balance sheets are already stretched, central banks are still dealing with above-target inflation, and private credit is taking on more of the investment burden at higher rates.
The key challenge will be sequencing - productivity needs to arrive before leverage becomes restrictive. Fiscal reform needs to take effect before interest costs absorb more revenue. Trade adaptation needs to occur without a further sustained rise in prices. Inflation needs to ease before central banks face pressure to support sovereign markets.
For investors, this environment weakens the assumption that long government bonds will always offset equity losses. Duration, inflation exposure and the credit structure behind infrastructure investment require closer attention. For businesses, the relevant cost of capital is no longer the policy rate alone. It includes term premia, supply-chain duplication, energy security, tariffs and the cost of carrying more inventory. For governments, new programmes need to be assessed against the full cost of financing and the tax base's behavioural response. Long-term cost reductions from reform are useful, but they do not automatically fund near-term transition costs.
I return to Burnham’s speech because it captures the political side of the issue without needing to carry the whole article. The programme assumes that the state can become more active while debt declines and fiscal credibility is preserved. That combination is possible if reform raises productivity, spending is reprioritised, and the tax base remains strong. It becomes much harder if long gilt yields remain near 6%, growth underperforms, and mobile capital responds to higher taxation.
The RBA and Fed decisions add the monetary constraint. Central banks are still raising rates because inflation has not returned securely to target. The $40 trillion US debt stock adds the fiscal constraint. Investors must absorb continued heavy issuance, but their capacity and willingness are not unlimited.
My central observation remains straightforward. The buffering capacity of advanced sovereign economies has been substantially eroded, and the measures used to manage that condition are delivering diminishing returns at rising cost because the underlying pressures now extend across fiscal policy, monetary policy, trade, energy and credit markets.
This does not establish an inevitable crisis. It establishes a more expensive operating environment with less room for policy error.
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